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The Retirement Behaviour of the Self-employed
in Britain
Abstract
We analyse the retirement behaviour of older self-employed workers, using a
life cycle framework and a multinomial logit model of dynamic employment and
retirement choices. Using data from the two-wave Retirement Survey, we nd
that greater actual or potential earnings decrease the probability of retirement
among the self-employed. In contrast to employees, none of gender, health
or family circumstances appear to a¤ect self-employed retirement decisions.
The dynamic analysis reveals that relatively few employees and virtually no
retirees switch into self-employment in later life. The switches that do occur are
motivated less by attempts to use self-employment as a bridge job or stepping
stoneto full retirement, than by self-employment being a last resort for less
a­ uent workers with job histories of weak attachment to the labour market.
We compare self-employed and employee retirement behaviour, and discuss the
policy implications of our results.
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1 Introduction
This paper asks what determines the retirement behaviour of older self-employed
workers, and analyses the dynamic process of occupational and retirement choices in
later life. Specically, we search for the factors that explain when the self-employed
retire, who chooses to become and remain self-employed in later life, and di¤erences
in self-employed retirement behaviour compared with employees.
There are several reasons why this topic may be of interest to academics and
policy-makers. First, while retirement among employees has been heavily researched
in the academic literature, relatively little is known about the retirement behaviour
of the self-employed.1 Yet the self-employed face di¤erent institutional restrictions on
retirement and possibly also di¤erent incentives to retire, having higher labour force
participation rates and lower retirement rates than employees.2 This makes self-
employment a potentially interesting occupational choice to policy-makers concerned
about falling labour force participation rates, ageing populations, and the prospect
of substantial future publicly-funded pension liabilities (Disney, 2000; Bovenberg,
2003). It raises the prospect that schemes to promote self-employment among older
workers might full twin objectives: of increasing overall labour force participation
rates among older workers while stimulating the economy to become more competitive
and entrepreneurial (OECD, 2000).
Clearly a better understanding of self-employed retirement behaviour is needed be-
fore one can begin to sketch the outlines of possible self-employment schemes for older
workers. In particular, we require evidence about whether lower self-employed retire-
ment rates relative to employees can be explained in terms of di¤erent preferences for
leisure relative to work; di¤erent incentives; or di¤erent institutional structures. Re-
1For studies on employee retirement, see Stock and Wise (1990a, 1990b), Berkovic and Stern
(1991), Lumsdaine et al (1992), Blau (1994, 1998), Ruhm (1996), Rust and Phelan (1997), Samwick
(1998), Friedberg (1999, 2003), Gustman and Steinmeier (2000a, 2000b, 2001), Baker (2002) and
Blundell et al (2002). In contrast, we know of few studies of the labour market behaviour of older
self-employed workers, chiey the US studies of Quinn (1980), Fuchs (1982), and Bruce et al (2000).
2For example, while only about one tenth of the overall workforce is self-employed in the US and
UK, about one third of the workforce over 65 in each country is self-employed a proportion that
has been relatively stable over time (Iams, 1987; Moralee, 1988; Bruce et al, 2000).
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garding institutions, for example, the self-employed do not usually receive employer-
or government-provided sickness leave or benets. Instead they have to provide their
own pension and health-care coverage, which suggests that life cycle saving might
be an integral aspect of self-employed behaviour. At the same time, self-employed
workers in Britain do not face a mandatory retirement age, unlike employees. Their
incentives might also di¤er from those of employees. In particular, the self-employed
do not face the problem of timing their separation from a rm in order to maximise
the value of occupational pension rights. In contrast, this problem is of primary im-
portance for employees with occupational pension plans where it has spawned several
rich models, including nes based on option value (Stock and Wise, 1990a, 1990b)
and dynamic programming (Rust and Phelan, 1997) approaches. These models may
be less appropriate for the self-employed, in part because they abstract from non-
pension asset accumulation in order to focus on endogenous switches in and out of
pension schemes; and also because the self-employed do not face incentive problems
embodied in occupational pen plans, relying instead on personal savings to nance
their retirement behaviour. For this reason, we use a life cycle approach to model
self-employed retirement behaviour.
It turns out that the life cycle model used in this paper can shed some light on
the determinants of self-employed retirement behaviour. We estimate the model using
data from the two-wave British Retirement Survey  the best micro-data source cur-
rently available in Britain. Because the self-employed are a minority of the workforce,
the Retirement Survey yields only a relatively small sample size (just under 200); nev-
ertheless, it is still possible to generate some interesting new ndings. Among these,
we nd that the determinants of self-employed retirement di¤er from those impact-
ing on employee retirement  an important point which any policy intervention
should take account of. We supplement this analysis by briey exploring dynamic
occupational and retirement choices in later life, obtaining evidence about the char-
acteristics and subsequent retirement behaviour of older workers who switch into self-
employment. These are presumably the individuals that any self-employment scheme
3
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for older workers is likely to attract; and we discuss the implications of our ndings
for policies attempting to promote self-employment via such schemes. To anticipate
our ndings, we suggest that the most e¤ective way to encourage older workers to
become and remain self-employed is to catch them when they are young, as most
switchers into self-employment in later life retire shortly thereafter. Also, advances in
health care that help keep older workers active appear to be a key aspect of any gov-
ernment initiatives to promote labour force participation and self-employment among
older workers. Specially, older employees in poor health are more likely to retire, and
less likely to switch into self-employment.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines a simple model of retirement
based on the life cycle hypothesis, together with its stochastic representation, and
suggestions for extensions to take account of possible sample selection bias in the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous occupational choice. Section 3
describes the data set, and the measurement of the explanatory variables. Section 4
presents and interprets the results. This comprises a static analysis of retirement
decisions, a dynamic analysis of transitions between di¤erent employment states over
the two waves of the Survey, and a sensitivity analysis. Section 5 discusses the policy
implications of our results, while Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The optimisation problem
The problem facing a specic agent aged t who plans to retire at age R and live until
age T is
max
c()
U =
Z R
t
expf (s  t)gu(c(s); 0) ds+
Z T
R
expf (s  t)gu(c(s); 1) ds

subject to
Z T
t
expf r(s  t)g c(s) ds = 
(R)
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where c() is consumption through time, u(; ) is an instananeousutility function
dened on consumption and retirement status respectively,  and r are discount and
interest rates, respectively, and 
(R) is current total lifetime wealth, which is a
function of retirement age. Lifetime wealth is the value of nancial, business and
housing assets plus the present value of all state pension (social security), personal
pension and labour incomes that an individual commands over the remainder of their
life. Its annuity stream is commonly referred to as permanent income.
We can solve this problem for the optimal consumption path c(; R) treating R
as parametric, and substitute the result back into the maximand to give the indirect
utility function, U(R). Then we can maximise the indirect utility function over R to
identify the optimal retirement age. Here we acknowledge that a key feature of being
self-employed is control over the retirement age. Using the envelope theorem gives
dU
dR
=   exp  (R  t)	r(c(t); R) +  d

dR
(1)
where r(c(t); R) := u(c(t); 1)   u(c(t); 0) is utility in retirement relative to work,
and  := dU=d
  0 is the marginal utility of wealth. We would usually expect
that r(c(t); R) > 0, i.e. the same amount of consumption is more enjoyable when
combined with leisure time (i.e. in retirement). Because of earnings opportunities in
work, we would also expect that d
=dR > 0, i.e. deferring retirement by one period
enhances the current stock of lifetime wealth by the amount of extra income generated
in that period.
The meaning of (1) is straightforward. The marginal utility of postponing the
retirement age R by a period involves foregoing utility from leisure with a neg-
ative impact but this is compensated by greater present and future consumption
possibilities a¤orded by greater lifetime wealth, which has a positive impact.
In order to analyse the determinants of an individuals current retirement status,
consider an individual who is considering retiring. By setting R = t in U they can
examine the utility that follows from retiring immediately. Whether or not immediate
5
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retirement is benecial is given by the sign of the derivative of U with respect to R,
namely
@U
dR

R=t
=  r(c(t); t) + 
R (2)
where 
R := d
=dR at R = t. For the reasons given above, both terms in (2) are
likely to be positive, and so there will be individuals for whom it is benecial to retire
(negative sign) and others for whom it is benecial to continue to work (positive
sign). Consequently it seems reasonable to model the probability that the individual
is retired at age t as some monotonic increasing function of the negative of (2), written
as
 = Pr

R  t = F (v) where v =   @U
dR

R=t
(3)
where F () is called the conditional mean functionin standard econometrics termi-
nology (Greene, 2003). We call this the retirement equation.
2.2 A statistical framework across individuals
For any individual we can observe retirement status, IR<t, where Ip is the indicator
function of the proposition p. We can also observe a number of covariates that
distinguish individuals from one another, x say. These covariates are associated with
the level of v through r c(t); t. We might write
v  f(x)  
R ;
where f is an unknown function which depends upon the unknown utility function
(taken to be a function of x), and 
R = d
=dR. Note the importance of an ap-
propriate specication of the vector x. It should capture person-specic preferences
relating to the work-leisure trade-o¤, to facilitate identication of any preference for
retirement (i.e., f(x)) separately from the incentives for retirement, given by 
R.
The incentive 
R can be measured directly if earnings from an extra period of
work are observed or imputed, as we explain in the next section. Note that 
R
6
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(which is henceforth called the accrual) is not necessarily 0 for retired individuals.
From the way in which we have solved the problem, the accrual is the incremental
change in my lifetime wealth were I currently to be working and decided not to retire
immediately but to defer for a small amount of time. It is true that this value may
be easier to compute for those currently working, but it is also clear that those who
have retired and can return to employment ought also to be making a calculation of
this kind.
So far  has been taken to be a constant, capturing the size of any substitution
e¤ect in retirement behaviour. More generally, we can allow for the possibility of
diminishing marginal utility of lifetime wealth by writing  = (
) = 0   1
,
where 0 > 0 ; 1  0 subject to (
)  0. Then 1 captures specically any in-
comee¤ect in retirement behaviour. In our empirical application, 
 can be measured
directly from micro data, while the sign of  can be checked in the results.
For the statistical treatment of this model, our data comprise the n tuples (i; xi;

i;
Ri), where i is the indicator function of retirement for individual i. We assume
that these tuples are exchangeable. We use the probit function for F and write
i := (v

i ), where () is the standard normal distribution function. Using linear
functionals for f as well as , our empirical model is
vi = 1 + x
T
i 1   (0   1
i)
Ri + i1 (4)
where i1 is an uncorrelated gaussian error term. The parameter vector  := (1; 1;
0; 1) can be estimated by maximising a standard probit log likelihood function
associated with (4). A testable prediction of the life-cycle model is that the accrual
has a negative e¤ect, and lifetime wealth a zero or positive e¤ect, on the probability
that a given individual is retired. Note that the life cycle model suggests that lifetime
wealth enters the retirement equation interactively rather than separately. The logic
is that the Lagrange multiplier  maps the accrual into retirement behaviour, since
 is the marginal utility of lifetime wealth. Allowing  to depend on lifetime wealth
7
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then gives rise to the interaction term in (4). Later we will test whether our empirical
results are sensitive to this aspect of the model specication.
An important question is whether there is unobservable heterogeneity with respect
to retirement status. Do the self-employed di¤er from employees in their retirement
behaviour in ways that cannot be captured by our covariates? Specically, might there
be unobservable variables that drive both retirement behaviour and the likelihood of
being self-employed? For example, perhaps very energetic individuals who enjoy
work and are therefore reluctant to retire are more likely to become self-employed.
To answer this question, we extend our statistical framework in the following way.
Consider the following probit selectionequation:
si = 2 + y
T
i 2 + i2 ; (5)
where i is self-employed (si = 1) if si  0, and is an employee (si = 0) if si < 0;
where yi is a vector of individual characteristics that bear on the occupational choice
decision, yi 6= xi in general; and where i2 is an uncorrelated gaussian error term,
such that i1; i2  BVN(0; 0; 1; 1; ). The key point is that (i; xi; 
i;
Ri) is only
observed for i if si = 1. The log-likelihood function for this model is
lnL() =
nX
i=1

isi ln2
 
1 + x
T
i 1   (0   1
i)
Ri; 2 + yTi 2; 

+si(1  i) ln2
   1   xTi 1 + (0   1
i)
Ri; 2 + yTi 2; 
 (1  si) ln
   2   yTi 2	 ; (6)
where 2(; ; ) denotes the bivariate normal distribution function. After estimating
the parameters  := (; 2; 2; ) by maximising (6), one can check for sample se-
lection by testing the hypothesis that  = 0. Thus controlling for sample selection
complements the observable heterogeneity in work-leisure preferences characterised
by f(x), with unobservable heterogeneity in these preferences.
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3 Data set and methodology
3.1 The Retirement Survey data set
We estimated the model outlined in the previous section using data from the British
Retirement Survey (RS). The RS is a rich two-wave data set containing individual-
and household-level information on personal and nancial characteristics, health and
labour market behaviour around the time of retirement. The rst wave contains
information from interviews conducted in 1988/89 with 3543 respondents who were
aged between 55 and 69, together with 609 spouses outside this age range. The
second wave took place in 1994, which involved re-interviewing about two thirds
of the original respondents and spouses in a single face-to-face survey. The other
one third of respondents either did not respond to the second interview or had died
between the two waves. Data from both waves are used in the current paper, with an
emphasis on explaining retirement behaviour and occupational choices in the second
wave.
An individual is dened as self-employed in the RS if their most recent job was
in self-employment rather than paid employment. Of the total sample, complete
information was available for 197 self-employed individuals.3 This is a smaller sample
than is often used for studying employee retirement behaviour, reecting the fact
that only a minority of the workforce is self-employed. It is also smaller than samples
on self-employed workers that have been drawn from the US Retirement History
Survey, including those of Fuchs (1982) (n = 443) and Quinn (1980) (n = 836). The
limitations of using a relatively small sample size should therefore be borne in mind
when the empirical results are discussed.
The RS contains several alternative denitions of retirement. One is a broad
denition, whereby an individual is retired if they consider themselves to be so. Self-
3Of the 1994 sample, 282 individuals were self-employed, of whom 85 were omitted because there
was incomplete information about one or more component of their lifetime wealth (see below). The
omitted individuals did not appear to have di¤erent observable characteristics to those remaining in
the sample.
9
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reported denitions of this kind may be criticised on the grounds that some indi-
viduals misclassify themselves. For example, it can be objected that some of the
self-employed respondents are not actually self-employed at all, but are claiming
self-employment status (e.g., consultancy) to justify retirement to their peers. We
will therefore also utilise in our empirical work an additional, narrower, denition of
retirement. To be dened as retired under this denition, an individual must be out
of work and not seeking work, and must cite being retired as the main reason for not
working.4
To give some idea of the di¤erence between the measures, some 64% of the sample
are retired on the broad denition, compared with 59% on the narrow denition. The
proportion retired on the broad denition compares with 81% of all individuals in
the 1994 RS (Tanner, 1998). This reects the greater tendency of the self-employed
compared with employees to work beyond the statutory retirement age, a well-known
stylised factin the UK (Tanner, 1997) and US (Quinn, 1980; Fuchs, 1982; Sickles
and Taubman, 1986; Bruce et al, 2000). Indeed, according to the 1994 RS, 73% of
the self-employed in 1994 worked beyond the statutory employee retirement age of 65
for men and 60 for women.
The RS also enables the researcher to compute lifetime wealth 
, and the ac-
crual, 
R. We next discuss issues involved in measuring these two variables, before
describing the other explanatory variables used in the empirical work.
3.2 Explanatory variables: Lifetime wealth and accrual
Because the computation of lifetime wealth imposes considerable demands on micro
data, most previous studies have tended to consider the e¤ects of just a subset of its
components on retirement.5 In contrast, the RS enables a comprehensive measure
4Several other retirement denitions have also been used in the literature, including ones based on
a discontinuous drop in wages or hours worked (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1984; Burtless and Mo¢ tt,
1985), or whether individuals receive low or zero wages (Honig and Hanoch, 1985). Information on
work hours is unavailable in the RS, ruling out use of the rst denition; and many self-employed
report zero incomes (Parker, 1997) making the second denition problematic.
5For example, Diamond and Hausman (1984), Honig and Hanoch (1985) and Burtless (1986)
considered only nancial wealth. Samwick (1998) also included private and state (social security)
10
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of lifetime wealth to be computed, encompassing many of those recommended in the
literature (see, e.g. Wol¤, 1987; Zagorsky 1999). As well as housing and nancial
wealth, it is also possible to calculate capitalised values of state pension, private and
occupational pension entitlements; future expected earnings; and expected future
business resale values. The RS contains detailed data on all of these sources of
lifetime wealth, which is computed at the individual level.
To save space, we give only a broad outline of the construction of lifetime wealth
(see Parker, 2003, for a fuller explanation). Information about house values and
mortgage debts outstanding in 1994 was used to calculate net housing wealth. Be-
cause of the wide coverage of nancial assets in the RS, a comprehensive measure
of nancial wealth was straightforward to compute from the 1994 data. More work
was required to compute state, private and occupational pension wealth. Fortunately,
the RS contains a wealth of information across the two waves that make relatively
rened estimates possible. This includes detailed information about income indexa-
tion formulae and other rules and provisions of each individual pension scheme. Also,
observed pension incomes in the rst wave enabled pension entitlements in the second
wave to be estimated for individuals with incomplete pension records, by matching
individuals with missing data in wave 2 to cases with observed data in both waves.
The longitudinal nature of the RS, and its detailed le of job history data, also enables
the researcher to infer current and future earnings of those working and the imputed
values of those no longer working (see below for further details). Recalling that life-
time wealth measures ones control over total current and future resources, earnings
wealth was estimated by applying average actual income growth rates to actual or im-
puted 1994 incomes until the expected age of retirement (see below). Finally, business
wealth was computed from responses to the RS question about the expected value
of businesses and the expected sale date. In the computation of the lifetime wealth
pension wealth; the latter alone was used by Gordon and Blinder (1980), McCarty (1990) and
Reimers and Honig (1996). Pension wealth also appears in Mitchell and Fields (1984), who ad-
ditionally used the NPV of labour market incomes (earnings wealth). Hogarth (1988) used just
earnings wealth. See Hurd (1990) for a discussion of all of these sources of lifetime wealth. Many
more authors analyse only single-period income ows, from investments, pensions and earnings,
without accounting for future values of these ows.
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components, all future income ows were capitalised using a discount rate of 3%; and
individual-specic life expectancy tables were used in the capitalisation calculations.
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE]
Because the composition of lifetime wealth might be of independent interest, Ta-
ble 1 summarises the holdings of each component, as well as the aggregate value, and
the accrual variable (see below) for our self-employed sample. Despite some limita-
tions  including the common use of banded data from which point estimates are
imputed, and the small number of respondents claiming business wealth6  the RS
has the advantage of containing comprehensive data on current wealth and future
entitlements. Also, its sample wealth component distributions match those published
in national accounts data (Disney et al, 1997). We would suggest however that earn-
ings wealth should be treated with some caution because 1994 earnings were uprated
to estimate post-1994 values by using the observed average self-employment income
growth rate, obtained from National Accounts data. The use of a common rather
than an individual-specic income growth rate estimated between the waves was mo-
tivated by the di¤erent macroeconomic conditions prevailing after 1994 (high growth)
compared with 1988/8994 (recession and low growth). While this is likely to avoid
the use of inappropriate growth rates, it is however also likely to understate the true
variability of earnings within the sample. Note also that if the self-employed under-
report their incomes (Pissarides and Weber, 1989), the e¤ect of this cannot be easily
removed from the present value calculation.
Despite these limitations, we felt it appropriate to retain earnings wealth in the
analysis. As pointed out by Baker et al (2003), lifetime earnings might capture het-
erogeneity in work preferences and so assist with identication in the cross-sectional
analysis.
Turning next to the accrual, recall that this is dened as the incremental value
from deferring retirement for another period. For the self-employed, earnings are the
6The small proportion of respondents claiming any business wealth in Table 1 may reect the fact
that many self-employed workers are in occupations like construction, trades and crafts, sales, and
vehicle maintenance in which there are virtually no tangible assets to sell. This seems to account
for the preponderance of missing values for business wealth in the raw RS data.
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only component of lifetime wealth that is directly a¤ected by such a deferral. This
is because neither early retirement provisions in occupational pensions nor SERPS
entitlements are relevant for the self-employed; private pension annuities are invariant
to the retirement date; nancial and housing wealth are not directly a¤ected by
retirement; and the present value of the state (social security) pension in Britain is
designed to be approximately invariant to the retirement age.7
A practical di¢ culty is imputing 1994 earnings, ei94, for individuals for whom
no earnings were observed in 1994. Imputation involved estimating earnings growth
rates, gi94, conditioned on a vector of explanatory variables observed in 1988/89,
denoted by hi88. By the properties of the lognormal distribution (treating this as a
convenient approximation to the distribution of earnings),
gi94 = ln ei94   ln ei88 = hTi88 + !i94 (7)
) E(ei94) = ei88: exp
 
hTi88^ + ^
2
!=2

; (8)
where !i94  N
 
0; 2!

is a stochastic disturbance and  is a vector of coe¢ cients.8
In order to impute earnings as accurately as possible, a general-to-specic regression
search was used to compute ^. The appendix contains details of the regression results.
Results are also given for employees, which are used later for comparative purposes.
The bottom two rows of Table 1 disaggregate the accrual for retired and non-
retired respondents. These data indicate that the accrual distribution for non-retirees
rst order stochastically dominates that of retirees. Checks revealed that this is not
merely an artefact of our imputation procedure, as very similar results were obtained
when actual earnings of non-retirees in 1994 were replaced with their imputed values
7To be sure, one can think of indirect e¤ects on resources from deferral of retirement, e.g., if
individuals move house when they retire, so that uctuations in house prices become relevant. But
most individuals do not move house at the same time as they retire. Similarly, businesses are not
necessarily sold at the time of retirement and realised as an accrual, e.g., because some family
businesses are bequeathed to successors. As noted above, only 4% of self-employed respondents in
the RS held any net business wealth in any case.
8This imputation procedure enjoys an advantage over that of Meghir and Whitehouse (1997)
by exploiting the 1988/89 wave of the RS, which was unavailable to those authors. Clearly, it is
very problematic to impute 1994 earnings for those individuals without recorded earnings even in
1988/89, something we therefore do not attempt.
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and comparisons were made with imputed earnings of retirees. Thus the di¤erent
accrual values seem to reect genuine di¤erences in earnings opportunities.
3.3 Other explanatory variables
Several non-pecuniary variables, x, are likely to a¤ect preferences for leisure relative
to work, and thereby the probability of retirement, . One such variable is age, which
is expected to increase the marginal value of leisure, as the remaining time to enjoy it
diminishes. On the other hand, cohort e¤ects might confound this prediction, e.g., if
older cohorts work harder than their younger counterparts. To allow for a non-linear
e¤ect in retirement-age patterns, the age data were represented by an orthogonal basis
of degree two. The use of orthogonal polynomials is necessary because the limited
range of the age data would result in strong collinearity if simply ageand age2were
used. Therefore we transform the data onto orthogonal linear and quadratic scales.
For our sample the transformations are
 1(x) =  0:8850 + 0:0133x
 2(x) = 5:3681  0:1650x+ 0:0013x2
(9)
which have the usual properties that
nX
i=1
 1(xi) =
nX
i=1
 2(xi) =
nX
i=1
 1(xi) 2(xi) = 0
nX
i=1

 1(xi)
	2
=
nX
i=1

 2(xi)
	2
= 1
(10)
when xi is the age of individual i in the sample of size n.
An aspect of ageing that is of special interest in the present study is the bridge
retirement process, whereby employees may choose self-employment as a stepping
stone to full retirement. We investigate this issue by checking whether the long
termself-employed have di¤erent retirement patterns compared with employees who
switched into self-employment fairly recently. For this reason, a dummy variable
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for whether the individual was self-employed in the rst wave of the RS (i.e., in
1988/89) is also included.9 In our sample 57.9% were dened as long-term self-
employed according to this denition.
A consideration that often arises when analysing behaviour of older workers is
health. An individuals own poor health, or that of a relative they look after, might
reduce their ability to run a business, and increase the value of spending time away
from work. Poor health is measured using two variables. One is a weighted score (on a
scale from 0 to 21) of 13 di¤erent disabilities relating to inability to undertake essential
tasks, termed Activities of Daily Living (see Grundy and Glaser, 1997, for details).
The second is a dummy variable for whether the individual is classied as disabled,
where disability is dened as any restriction or lack (resulting from an impairment)
of ability to perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal
for a human being.10 In our sample 40% were classied as disabled, and the mean
poor health score was 1:91.11 A dummy variable is also dened for whether individuals
care for a sick relative, since this might increase the relative disutility of work relative
to leisure, the latter including time spent in the caring capacity. Carers comprised
5.6% of the sample.
Other relevant family-level variables are the number of children living in the house-
hold (the mean number in the sample was 2.31), and whether the individual was mar-
ried (82.7% were). As above, these variables might be expected to increase the desire
for leisure (retirement) relative to continued work. Finally, a family-level dummy vari-
able that is expected to work in the other direction is whether the individuals spouse
is working (see Blau, 1998). Although we do not explicitly consider issues of joint
9See also Blau (1994), who stresses the importance of job history variables. While work status
six years previously might not give a precise idea of long termwork status in the conventional
(i.e., employee) sense, the low survival rates of small businesses suggests that this interpretation is
not untenable for the self-employed. It will be seen below that this variable is indeed an informative
discriminator among the self-employed.
10These health measures are based on self-assessed information. Self-reported health measures
have been criticised in the literature because people can blame being out of the labour force on poor
health (Parsons, 1982). But Bound (1991) points out that self-reported measures may be no worse
than objectivemeasures.
11The relatively large number of disabled respondents might either reect the more dangerous
working conditions of the self-employed (as observed by OECD, 2000), or an institutional bias
against employees with disabilities.
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retirement in this paper,12 if leisure is a joint household good, then having a working
spouse might be expected to reduce the individuals surplus of post-retirement util-
ity over pre-retirement utility, so decreasing the probability of retirement. In fact,
it is unclear whether joint retirement should be more or less important for the self-
employed relative to employees. On one hand, the self-employed have more variable
incomes than employees do, and so can be expected to benet more from household
income smoothing derived from spousal income. Hence the retirement of a previously
working spouse might yield an extra incentive for a self-employed person to retire,
as the benet from income smoothing is removed. On the other hand, if older self-
employed workers are less well o¤ on average than their employee counterparts (see
below), then retirement of a spouse might make it all the more important that the
self-employed person continues to work in order to safeguard household income.
Several other explanatory variables are also included in the econometric specica-
tion. One is a dummy for female gender (comprising 30% of the sample) which can
be used to isolate any di¤erences in preferences between the sexes in self-employed
retirement behaviour. Two others were the number of years of schooling (the sam-
ple mean was 10:3), and a dummy variable for whether the individual had acquired
vocational qualications (19.3% of the sample had). Both of these variables might
capture non-pecuniary aspects of jobs that make retirement relatively more or less
attractive to continued work. So might social class, which is inferred in the RS from
details about an individuals current or most recent occupation, narrowly dened. It
is measured on an ordinal scale from 0 to 5, with 0 being the lowestclass. This was
re-coded as ve dummy variables to allow for the possibility of a non-monotonic or
non-linear response to social class. In our sample 48.1% belonged to one of the top
two social classes.
12See, e.g., Hurd (1990), Zweimuller et al (1996), Gustman and Steinmeier (2000b) and Baker
(2002). It seems justied not to model joint retirement explicitly in the present context because, as
pointed out by Tanner (1997), the clear majority of couples [in the RS] do not retire at the same
time. (p. 48).
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4 Estimation and Results
This section is divided into three parts. In the rst, we estimate the static retirement
equation (4), discuss the results, and compare them with those obtained for an em-
ployee sample taken from the RS. We also address issues of sample selection here. In
the second part, we provide a dynamic analysis of retirement behaviour around the
time of retirement, exploring the transitions between self-employment, employment,
and retirement over the two waves of the RS. The third part contains a sensitivity
analysis, to provide some checks on the robustness of the results.
4.1 Static analysis of retirement
We rst estimated (4) by maximum likelihood. Table 2 contains the results for both
broad (columns 1a and 1b) and narrow (columns 2a and 2b) denitions of retirement.
All of the regressions presented in Table 2 are highly signicant and data congruent,
with good hit rates and insignicant Hosmer-Lemeshow statistics.13
Columns 1a and 2a measure both substitution (accrual) and income (accrual times
lifetime wealth) e¤ects. The latter are insignicantly di¤erent from zero, implying
that 1  0. This suggests that the marginal utility of lifetime wealth is approxi-
mately constant for the self-employed, so that retirement and lifetime wealth are not
strongly linked (see also Gustman and Steinmeier, 2001; and Blundell et al, 2002,
for similar ndings based on reduced form studies of employees). Imposing this re-
striction yields the results in columns 1b and 2b, in which the accrual now has a
signicant negative e¤ect on retirement decisions. This result is in accordance with
the life cycle model, implying that greater actual or potential earnings (the substitu-
tion e¤ect) delay retirement. These ndings are consistent with those of Meghir and
Whitehouse (1997), who found using RS data that higher imputed earnings tend to
delay job exits among employees.14
13All estimations were performed using LIMDEP 8.0, using robust standard errors derived from
a sandwich-style covariance matrix estimator. See the notes to Table 2 and Greene (2002, 2003) for
further details about these probit model performance measures.
14The reason for the signicance of 
R once 
R
 is dropped is partly explained by the high
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[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE]
Apart from the accrual, only two other explanatory variables are consistently
signicant for both denitions of retirement. One is age, which has a strong positive
e¤ect on retirement probabilities as expected, suggesting that the marginal utility of
leisure relative to work increases as self-employed individuals get older. The other is
long term self-employment status, suggesting that the long-term self-employed have
a lower probability of retirement at every age. Two other explanatory variables are
statistically signicant using the narrower denition of retirement. These are age
squared, which has a negative e¤ect implying that the impact of age on retirement
diminishes with age, and having a working spouse. The latter provides some limited
support for the notion that retirement is a joint decision for couples.
Why do comparatively recent entrants to self-employment have a higher tendency
to retire soon afterwards? One possibility is that some former employees purposefully
choose self-employment as a bridge job, or form of partial retirement, as a stepping
stone to full retirement (Quinn, 1980). Another possibility is that these employees
are marginal or peripheral workers who are pushed into self-employment as a last
resort. In an attempt to discriminate between these two explanations, we examined
the detailed inter-wave job history les that accompany the RS. Table 3 presents
summary statistics that distinguish between the long termself-employed (i.e., who
were self-employed in both waves), and the Wave 2 self-employees who were employ-
ees in Wave 1. We call the latter switchers. The results suggest that switchers
have a signicantly and substantially greater incidence of part-time jobs and jobless
spells between the waves than the long-term self-employed do. They also have sig-
nicantly and substantially lower wealth and actual or potential earnings; are older
on average; and have a higher unconditional probability of retirement. This suggests
(tentatively given the relatively small sample sizes) that switchers have a relatively
weak attachment to the labour market with less secure job matches, drifting in and
out of temporary and part-time work of several kinds, including self-employment.
correlation coe¢ cient of 0:838 between the two variables. Therefore our preferred results are columns
1b and 2b, which remove this source of collinearity.
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While part-time work is not inconsistent with the notion of bridge jobs (Fuchs, 1982),
the fact that switchers have so many more short-term jobs and are worse o¤ than the
long-term self-employed suggests that some pushfactors are present too. Switchers
certainly cannot be characterised as a­ uent employees who are voluntarily downsizing
their jobs as a prelude to full retirement. In short, new self-employment jobs among
older British workers seem to be less a form of partial retirement than a concerted
e¤ort by vulnerable workers to remain active in the workforce.
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
There is also some weak evidence from Table 3 that switchers have somewhat
worse health than the long term self-employed. They are also more likely to be
female. But, as is evident from Table 2, neither health nor gender exerts a signicant
impact on the retirement decision in 1994 once long-term self-employment status is
controlled for. This nding contrasts with previous evidence for employees.15 It also
contrasts with our own ndings based on a sample of employees taken from the RS
(the fact that this is also a relatively small sample might suggest that sample sizes
are not driving the self-employed results). Table 4 replicates for our RS sample of
employees the specications reported in columns 1b and 2b of Table 2. The results
from this exercise will be discussed more fully below; for now, it su¢ ces to observe
that among employees, females and those with wors health are signicantly more
likely to retire. For the self-employed, however, these results suggest that preferences
are similar across genders, even while incentives di¤er (self-employed females have
signicantly lower accruals than self-employed males). Second, regarding health, it is
possible that the self-employed are used to working when they are ill, as a consequence
of their inability to access employer sick pay or sickness insurance schemes (Perry and
Rosen, 2004). And, the exibility of self-employment might provide workers with ways
of circumventing any physical limitations they face. Of course, these are only tentative
hypotheses, and further research based on larger samples or more detailed case studies
15For US evidence, see Burkhauser (1979), Gordon and Blinder (1980), Hogarth (1988), Berkovec
and Stern (1991) and Samwick (1998). For UK evidence see Meghir and Whitehouse (1997). Siddiqui
(1997) provides German evidence.
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is needed to dig deeper into the underlying causes of the phenomenon. Nevertheless, it
seems possible to conclude that institutional di¤erences might explain why employee
retirement behaviour is more sensitive to gender, health, and age.16 Female employees
have an earlier mandatory retirement age than males; early retirement schemes within
corporations can enable employers to remove workers who take excessive sick leave;
and there are binding mandatory retirement age limits. None of these provisions
apply to the self-employed.
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE]
Comparing columns 1b and 2b of Table 2 with columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 re-
veals other di¤erences in the determinants of retirement between employed and self-
employed Britons. Neither employment status in 1988/89 nor the accrual are sig-
nicant for employees whereas they are for the self-employed.17 And some aspects
of family structure appear to matter more for employees than for the self-employed.
In particular, the presence of children and a working spouse appear to decrease the
likelihood that employees will retire, while these variables are less important for the
self-employed.
Finally, we consider what the results so far tell us about why the self-employed
retire later on average than employees do. The evidence points strongly to long-
term self-employment status as a central part of th answer. In particular, if we
remove the long-term self-employed from the self-employed sample, the proportion of
the self-employed switchersfrom employment in 1988/89 who are retired under the
16Note that the age-retirement relationship is approximately linear for employees, without a signif-
icant diminishing e¤ect as was found for the self-employed in Table 2; and the size of the coe¢ cients
on linear age for employees are approximately double those estimated for the self-employed.
17Note, however, that the accrualin Table 4 should really be regarded simply as actual or imputed
earnings for employees. (They were calculated in the same way as for the self-employed see the
last columns of Table A1 in the appendix.) A true accrual for employees should also include the
value of occupational rights conditional on the date of retirement (Blundell et al, 2002). Therefore
the results in Table 4 a¤ord an illustrative comparison only, and are certainly not intended as a
denitive model of employee retirement a task that goes beyond the scope of the present article
(see Meghir and Whitehouse, 1997; Blundell et al, 2002; Bingley and Lanot, 2004). Even so, accrual
values are higher for employees than for the self-employed: the absolute t-statistic for di¤erences
in ln(1 + 
R) between the two occupations is 6:239. Even allowing for income under-reporting by
the self-employed of 30% (Pissarides and Weber, 1989) does not change this result, merely reducing
the t-statistic to 4:675. As noted above, part of the reason for earlier retirement by employees no
doubt reects incentives for early retirement embodied in occupational pension schemes (Disney et
al, 1994), which we do not attempt to quantify here.
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broad denition is 83%: a very similar proportion to that of employees (see Table 3
and Section 3, respectively). In contrast, the proportion of long-term self-employed
who are retired is only 50% (Table 3). This is where the root of the di¤erence be-
tween paid employment and self-employment retirement rates seems to lie. It appears
to have little to do with unobserved heterogeneity of the self-employed (sample se-
lection), since estimation of (6) yielded ^ = 0:036 (standard error = 3:063).18 So
while these ndings cannot denitively exclude the possibility of unobservable het-
erogeneity, they certainly provide no support for the notion that people who select
into self-employment are systematically di¤erent with respect to latent preferences
for work relative to retirement.
4.2 Dynamic analysis of retirement
The two-wave nature of the RS makes it possible to analyse transitions between three
labour market states: working in self-employment, working in paid employment, and
being retired. An analysis of this issue is helpful because it sheds light on the dynamics
of retirement, and puts the results for the self-employed into a broader perspective.
One can identify the factors that determine transitions between the two waves of
the panel by generalising the binary choice model (5) into a three-state multinomial
logit:
Pr

si94 = j

=
expfyTi88jgP2
m=0 expfyTi88mg
j = 0; 1; 2 ; (11)
where
si94 :=
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
0 if i is retired by 1994
1 if i is working as an employee by 1994
2 if i is working as self-employed by 1994
The j are vectors of coe¢ cients for each employment group j, and yi88 is a vector
18In estimating (6) by FIML, the y variables used in the selection equation (5) include all of those
used in (4), but measured at 1988/89 (rather than at 1994) values. Complete results are available
from the authors on request.
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of explanatory variables observed in 1988/89. Following conventional practice, we
identify the parameters of this model by imposing the vector normalisation 0 = 0.
Table 5 presents the matrix of transitions between each employment group. It
shows that the largest number of transitions is from any kind of work to retirement.
One quarter of the working self-employed in 1994 came from retirement or paid em-
ployment in 1988/89, while there were very few transitions from self-employment to
paid employment between the waves. However, only 3.6% [=12/331] of working em-
ployees in 1988/89 who continued to work in 1994 switched to self-employment over
the 5 year interval  a lower switching rate than reported in previous US studies.19
Detailed examination of the job history les identied a further 24 employees in Wave
1 who tried self-employment at some time between the two waves but who were re-
tired by 1994. Thus while there is some evidence of transitions between employment
groups generally, and into self-employment specically, the numbers involved appear
to be fairly modest.
[INSERT TABLES 5 & 6 AROUND HERE]
To explore the matter further, we estimated (11) using data from both waves of
the RS. We utilised a similar specication to that used elsewhere in the paper, apart
from excluding a working spouse variable (unavailable in 1988/89), and including
dummies for employment status in Wave 1. The results appear in Table 6. Even
after controlling for observable characteristics, most of the explanatory power comes
from strong persistence in occupational choices. Interestingly, Table 6 indicates a
negative e¤ect from poor health on participation in self-employment (but not paid
employment), suggesting that unhealthy respondents in Wave 1 prefer to retire than
to switch into self-employment later in life. In contrast, as we found earlier, poor
health does not appear to hasten retirement among those who have already chosen
self-employment.
19Fuchs (1982) and Bruce et al (2000) each reported a two-year switching rate of 4%.
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4.3 Sensitivity analysis
It is desirable to check the robustness of our results. We did so in several ways. First,
we tried an alternative specication of the retirement probit in which the interaction
term 
R
 was replaced by 
, thereby conditioning i on 
R and 
 separately (as in,
e.g., Blundell et al, 2002). The results were very similar to those reported in Table 2,
with the coe¢ cient on 
 still being statistically insignicant.
Second, we checked the sensitivity of our results to di¤erent accrual imputation
methods. For example, we applied a common (average) self-employment earnings-
growth rate to all respondents with observed Wave 1 earnings but no Wave 2 earnings,
instead of the individual-specic earnings growth rates estimated in the appendix.
Results were qualitatively the same as those in Table 2.
Third, we checked whether the quadratic e¤ects of age on self-employed retirement
behaviour captured any peaks in the data at ages 60 and 65 (the female and male
mandatory retirement ages for employees in Britain). No e¤ects were found when two
dummies were included: a Wald test statistic of 2(2) = 1:49 was unable to reject
the null hypothesis of insignicance. We also checked for outliers and identied seven
observations with especially large accrual values, but removing them did not change
the results in any noticeable way.
Fourth, we asked whether pooling self-employed and employee observations, makes
any di¤erence to the results. We investigated this question by interacting all variables
and the constant term with a dummy for self-employment status. This did not
change any of the ndings. A joint test of signicant di¤erences between the two
occupational groups was upheld: a Wald test statistic of 2(18) = 68:82 rejected the
null hypothesis of a common specication.
Finally, we checked whether an intercept dummy was su¢ cient to capture gender
di¤erences in self-employed retirement behaviour. We did so by testing the explana-
tory power of a full set of gender and variable interaction terms. A Wald statistic
of 2(17) = 16:83 failed to reject the null hypothesis that separate specications are
unnecessary.
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5 Policy discussion
Why might a better understanding of self-employment retirement behaviour matter to
policy makers? In this section, we shall briey address this question, on the working
assumption that the government seeks to encourage labour force participation among
older workers, while also seeking to promote self-employment separately as part of a
general pro-enterprise stance.
One possible reason for the policy relevance of this research is that average re-
tirement ages are substantially higher in self-employment than in paid employment,
implying that encouraging older retired or unemployed employees to become self-
employed could stimulate greater aggregate labour force participation. Second, know-
ing why some individuals choose to become self-employed in later life might also as-
sist policy-makers in determining the appropriate structure of any self-employment
or business start-up scheme targeted at older workers. An important related issue is
the duration of job spells among those switching into self-employment in later life. In
addition, governments might be interested in discovering whether, once workers are
self-employed, there is anything they can do to keep them working there rather than
retiring  again, as part of a labour force participation policy.
Regarding appropriate forms of policy intervention, it is important to bear in
mind the results from our dynamic analysis which illustrated the persistence of oc-
cupational and participation choices in later life. Specically, it would seem that
one way of getting older workers to become self-employed is to encourage them to
be self-employed when they are young. This highlights the value of formulating a
long-term strategy to facilitate self-employment in the workforce, since many young
self-employed workers eventually become old self-employed workers.
More generally, safeguarding workershealth appears to be an important aspect of
keeping more people in work. Interestingly, the mechanisms appear to be di¤erent for
employees and the self-employed. For employees, poor health increases the probability
of retirement. While we could not nd a similar e¤ect for the self-employed, we saw
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that individuals in poor health are signicantly less likely to choose a spell of self-
employment in later life. Therefore advances in health-care that help keep older
workers active appear to be a key aspect of any government initiatives to promote
labour force participation and self-employment among older workers.
When we look at the characteristics of those employees who switch into self-
employment in later life, other policy implications emerge. Only a limited number
of older working employees switch into self-employment. Of those that do, few of
them fall into the category of a­ uent workers using it as a bridge job to make a
gentle transition to full retirement; most are peripheral workers with limited nancial
means who are engaged in a succession of short term and often part time jobs. If
blanket policies were to be devised to make it easier for employees to become self-
employed, our results suggest that these types of worker are the most likely to take up
the policy. Unfortunately, relatively few of them end up creating long-lived businesses,
being much more likely to retire than are established business owners who have been
self-employed for a long time. Therefore it is not clear what would be gained by
a policy that encouraged such workers to enter self-employment a point that has
added force as peripheral workers have also been identied as the most di¢ cult to
assist in unemployment-to-self-employment start-up programmes (Bendick and Egan,
1987). Amore promising route might be job skill programmes and managerial training
programmes dedicated to self-employed workers specically (Devaney and Kim, 2003).
And longer-term self-employment policies also look promising, as workers who persist
with self-employment have the lowest average retirement rates of all workers.
Another class of policy interventions might seek to operate on the margin of
keeping self-employed individuals in work rather than retiring. Any policies of this
kind need to recognise that the self-employed exhibit di¤erent retirement behaviour
than employees, although our ndings are necessarily tentative given the relatively
small size (197) of our sample. Because higher earnings around retirement seem to
deter retirement by the self-employed, maintaining or cutting current levels of income
tax might help sustain continued workforce participation by these individuals. But
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our results furnish few other concrete suggestions for policies that would also work
towards this end.
6 Conclusion
Several ndings emerge from this enquiry into the retirement behaviour of British
self-employed workers based on Retirement Survey (RS) data. First, estimation of a
simple life-cycle model identied a few signicant determinants of self-employed re-
tirement behaviour. Specically, higher earnings around retirement decrease the prob-
ability of retirement, while age increases it. Also, self-employed individuals who were
self-employed six years previously (the long termself-employed) are signicantly less
likely to retire than those who were not. The switchersinto self-employment in later
life do not resemble a­ uent employees downsizing to enjoy a gentle transition to full
retirement. Instead, they tend to be marginal workers with unstable job histories
and limited means, some of whom appa ently turn to self-employment as a last resort
before nally retiring. Retirement rates were found to be similar for switchers and
employees who retired instead. The main di¤erence between the self-employed and
employees is therefore between the long term self-employed and employees. Our suc-
cess in nding some signicant determinants of self-employed retirement behaviour
is reassuring in view of the well-documented heterogeneity of the self-employed, and
the inability of researchers to explain other aspects of their labour supply behaviour
(Rees and Shah, 1994).
Second, several variables that might have been expected to a¤ect self-employed
retirement propensities turned out to be statistically insignicant. These include poor
health and gender, which both signicantly a¤ect employee retirement behaviour. Al-
though the small self-employed sample size used here might explain this result, other
explanations grounded in institutional di¤erences are also tenable. These include
mandatory employee retirement ages that come earlier for females than for males,
and government- and employer-provided sickness benets. None of these provisions
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apply to the self-employed.
Third, our dynamic analysis identied only a limited number of transitions be-
tween di¤erent labour market states among older workers, with persistence in retire-
ment, paid employment and self-employment being the norm. A greater proportion of
older employees made a transition to self-employment than the other way round, but
this amounted to only 3.6% of all older employees over a 5 year time horizon. We also
found that while poor health does not a¤ect the retirement behaviour of older self-
employed workers directly, it does signicantly decrease the probability that workers
will move into this kind of work.
The policy implications of our ndings can be summarised as follows. First, the
scope for government to encourage greater labour force participation among older
workers by promoting self-employment as a vehicle may be quite limited. The per-
sistence of employment choices in later life, and the nding that only the long-term
self-employed retire signicantly later than employees do, highlights the importance
of promoting self-employment among younger workers, some of whom will remain in
self-employment into old age. This suggests a longer term policy horizon, though
to the extent that these individuals are likely to enter self-employment in any case,
the deadweight costs of such a policy are likely to be non-trivial. Second, policies
to promote better health among older workers are likely to a¤ect the self-employed
mainly by operating on the occupational choice margin, whereas for employees the
policy would mainly work by postponing retirement.
Clearly, much remains to be done to rene the analysis and the policy recom-
mendations advanced here, and to dig more deeply into the nature of employment
transitions in later life. The availability of more high quality longitudinal data 
such as the new English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing  will be an integral part of
this research agenda.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank seminar participants at Liverpool University, the
27
Page 27 of 88
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Max Planck Institute in Jena, the 2001 Royal Economic Society Conference, the 2001
European Meetings of the Econometric Society Conference, and the 2004 European
Society for Population Economics for helpful comments on an earlier draft. This
research was supported by ESRC Grant Number 000-22-0020. We are also grateful to
the ESRC Data Archive at Essex University for making the Retirement Survey data
available. The usual disclaimer applies.
28
Page 28 of 88
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
References
Baker, M. (2002). The retirement behaviour of married couples evidence from the
spouses allowance, Journal of Human Resources, 37, 134.
Baker, M., Gruber, J., and Milligan, K. (2003). The retirement incentive e¤ects of
Canadas Income Security Programs, Canadian Journal of Economics, 36, 26190.
Bendick, M. and Egan, M. L. (1987). Transfer payment diversion for small busi-
ness development: British and French experience, Industrial & Labour Relations
Review, 40, 52842.
Berkovec, J. and Stern, S. (1991). Job exit behaviour of older men, Econometrica,
59, 189210.
Bingley, P. and Lanot, G. (2004). Employer pay policies, public transfers and the
retirement decisions of men and women in Denmark, European Economic Review,
48, 181200.
Blau, D. (1994). Labour force dynamics of older men, Econometrica, 62, 15780.
Blau, D. (1998). Labour force dynamics of older married couples, Journal of Labour
Economics, 16, 595629.
Blundell, R., Meghir, C. and Smith, S. (2002). Pension incentives and the pattern
of early retirement, Economic Journal, 112, C153C170.
Bound, J. (1991). Self-reported vs. objective measures of health in retirement mod-
els, Journal of Human Resources, 26, 31530.
Bovenverg, A. L. (2003). Financing retirement in the European Union, International
Tax & Public Finance, 10, 71334.
Bruce, D., Holtz-Eakin, D. and Quinn, J. (2000). Self-employment and labour market
transitions at older ages, Working Paper No. 200012, Center for Retirement
Research, Boston College.
Burkhauser, R. (1979). The pension acceptance decision of older workers, Journal
of Human Resources, 14, 6375.
Burtless, G. (1986). Social security, unanticipated benet increases, and the timing
29
Page 29 of 88
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
of retirement, Review of Economic Studies, 53, 781805.
Burtless, G. and Mo¢ tt, R. (1985). The joint choice of retirement age and post-
retirement hours of work, European Economic Review, 3, 20936.
Devaney, S. A. and Kim, H. (2003). Older self-employed workers and planning for
the future, Journal of Consumer A¤airs, 37, pp. 12342.
Diamond, P. A. and Hausman. J. A. (1984). Individual retirement and savings
behaviour, Journal of Public Economics, 23, 81114.
Disney, R. (2000). Crises in public pension programmes in OECD: What are the
reform options? Economic Journal, 110, F1F23.
Disney, R., Grundy, E. and Johnson, P. (eds.) (1997). The Dynamics of Retirement,
DSS Research Report No. 72, The Stationery O¢ ce, London.
Disney, R., Meghir, C. and Whitehouse, E. (1994). Retirement behaviour in Britain,
Fiscal Studies, 15, 2443.
Friedberg, L. (1999). The e¤ect of old age assistance on retirement, Journal of
Public Economics, 71, 21332.
Friedberg L. (2003). The impact of technological change on older workers: evidence
from data on computer use, Industrial & Labour Relations Review, 56, 51129.
Fuchs, V. R. (1982). Self-employment and labour-force participation of older males,
Journal of Human Resources, 17, 33957.
Gordon, R. and Blinder, A. (1980). Market wages, reservation wages, and retirement
decisions, Journal of Public Economics, 14, 277308.
Greene, W. H. (2002). LIMDEP 8.0 Econometric Modelling Guide, Volumes 1 and
2, Econometric Software Inc., New York.
Greene, W. H. (2003). Econometric Analysis, 5th Edition, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey.
Grundy, E. and Glaser, K. (1997). Disability, health, receipt of benets and receipt
and provision of care, in Disney et al (eds.) (1997).
Gustman, A. L. and Steinmeier, T. L. (1984). Partial retirement and the analysis of
retirement behaviour, Industrial & Labour Relations Review, 37, 40315.
Gustman, A. L. and Steinmeier, T. L. (2000a). Retirement outcomes in the Health
30
Page 30 of 88
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
and Retirement Study, Social Security Bulletin, 63, 5771.
Gustman, A. L. and Steinmeier, T. L. (2000b). Retirement in dual-career families:
A structural model, European Economic Review, 18, 50345.
Gustman, A. L. and Steinmeier, T. L. (2001). Retirement and wealth, Social Security
Bulletin, 64, 6691.
Hogarth, J. M. (1988). Accepting an early retirement bonus: an empirical study,
Journal of Human Resources, 23, 2133.
Honig, M. and Hanoch, G. (1985). Partial retirement as a separate mode of retire-
ment behaviour, Journal of Human Resources, 20, 2146.
Hurd, M. (1990). The joint retirement decision of husbands and wives, in D. A. Wise
(ed.), Issues in the Economics of Ageing, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Iams, H. M. (1987). Jobs of persons working after receiving retired worker benets,
Social Security Bulletin, 50, 419.
Lumsdaine, R. L., Stock, J. H. and Wise, D. A. (1992). Three models of retirement:
computational complexity versus predictive validity, in D. A. Wise (ed.), Topics
in the Economics of Ageing, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
McCarty, T. (1990). The e¤ect of social security on married womens labour force
participation, National Tax Journal, 43, 95110.
Meghir, C. and Whitehouse, E. (1997). Labour mark t transitions and retirement of
men in the UK, Journal of Econometrics, 79, 32754.
Mitchell, O. S. and Fields, G. S. (1984). The economics of retirement behaviour,
European Economic Review, 2, 84105.
Moralee, L. (1998). Self-employment in the 1990s, Labour Market Trends, 106,
12130.
OECD (2000). The partial renaissance of self-employment, in OECD Economic
Outlook, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.
Parker, S. C. (1997). The distribution of self-employment income in the U.K., 1976
1991, Economic Journal, 107, 45566.
Parker, S. C. (2003). The distribution of wealth among older self-employed Britons,
31
Page 31 of 88
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Fiscal Studies, 24, 2343.
Parsons, D. O. (1982). The male labour-force participation decision health, re-
ported health and economic incentives, Economica, 49, 8191.
Perry, C. W. and Rosen, H. S. (2004). The self-employed are less likely to have
health insurance than wage earners. So what? in Holtz-Eakin, D. and Rosen,
H. S. (eds.) Public Policy and the Economics of Entrepreneurship, MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA., pp. 2357.
Pissarides, C. A. and G. Weber (1989) An expenditure-based estimate of Britains
black economy, Journal of Public Economics, 39, 1732.
Quinn, J. F. (1980). Labour-force participation patterns of older self-employed work-
ers, Social Security Bulletin, 43, 1728.
Rees, H. and Shah, A. (1994). The characteristics of the self-employed: the supply
of labour, in J. Atkinson and D. J. Storey (eds.), Employment, the Small Firm
and the Labour Market, Routledge, London.
Reimers, C. and Honig, M. (1996). Responses to social security by men and women
myopic and far-sighted behaviour, Journal of Human Resources, 31, 35982.
Ruhm, C. J. (1996). Do pensions increase the labour supply of older men?Journal
of Public Economics, 59, 15775.
Rust, J. and Phelan, C. (1997). How Social Security and Medicare a¤ect retirement
behaviour in a world of incomplete markets, Econometrica, 65, 781832.
Samwick, A. A. (1998). New evidence on pensions, social security, and the timing of
retirement, Journal of Public Economics, 70, 20736.
Sickles, R. C. and Taubman, P. (1986). An analysis of the health and retirement
status of the elderly, Econometrica, 54, 133956.
Siddiqui, S. (1997). The impact of health on retirement behaviour: empirical evi-
dence from West Germany, Health Economics, 6, 42538.
Stock, J. H. and Wise, D. A. (1990a). Pensions, the option value of work, and
retirement, Econometrica, 58, 115180.
Stock, J. H. and Wise, D. A. (1990b). The pension inducement to retire: an option
32
Page 32 of 88
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
value analysis, in D. A. Wise (ed.), Issues in the Economics of Aging, University
of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Tanner, S. (1997). The dynamics of retirement behaviour, in Disney et al (eds.)
(1997).
Tanner, S. (1998). The dynamics of male retirement behaviour, Fiscal Studies, 19,
17596.
Wol¤, E. N. (1987). The e¤ects of pensions and social security on the distribu-
tion of wealth in the US, in E. N. Wol¤ (ed.), International Comparisons of the
Distribution of Household Wealth, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Zagorsky, J. L. (1999). Young baby-boomerswealth, Review of Income & Wealth,
45, 13556.
Zweimuller, J., Winter-Ebmer, R. and Falkinger, J. (1996). Retirement of spouses
and social security reform, European Economic Review, 40, 44972.
33
Page 33 of 88
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Table 1. Summary statistics of lifetime wealth and the accrual 
 
 
     Non-   Quantiles    
     zero min.  25%     Median    75%   max. 
     (%) 
 
Sources of wealth § 
 
Housing (35.59 %)   84 0 31939      37297     71651 250674 
 
Financial non-housing (17.29 %) 86 0     954        6937     24520 185024 
 
State pension (18.35 %)  93 0 20007      26163     29963   91924 
 
Private pension (6.83 %)  39 0         0               0     10380 167214 
 
Occupational pension (7.65 %) 32 0         0    0       8714 178486 
 
Earnings (13.61 %)   54 0         0         1011    18556 543904 
 
Business (0.68 %)     4 0         0   0     0 108062 
 
Lifetime, Ω    100 15547  76871    115240    193788 865124 
 
 
Accrual, ΩR
 
Non-retired †    65    0  2947        8450       16426 123500 
 
Retired    97 0    130        1752        7808   30790 
 
 
Notes:  
Sample size: 197. Authors’ calculations from Retirement Survey data. All values 
expressed in £, net of tax, 1994 prices.  
 
§. Average percentages of lifetime wealth in parentheses. 
†. Broad definition of retirement. 
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Table 2. Determinants of self-employed retirement probabilities  
             
       Broad  ret. definition           Narrow ret.definition  .
        (1a)      (1b)     (2a)     (2b) 
Constant    2.096 *  2.160 * 2.503 * 2.622 ** 
   (1.003)  (1.015)  (1.038)  (1.048) 
No. Children    0.020   0.016    0.047   0.048 
    (0.078)  (0.077)  (0.080)  (0.080) 
Disabled    0.067   0.071  -0.321  -0.318 
    (0.282)  (0.283)  (0.298)  (0.302) 
Married   -0.019  -0.006   0.045   0.074 
    (0.349)  (0.347)  (0.335)  (0.331) 
Linear age   12.482 **  12.345 **  14.424 **  14.339 ** 
    (3.023)  (2.947)  (3.212)  (3.143) 
Quadratic age   -4.920  -4.979   -6.086 * -6.078 * 
    (2.932)  (2.881)  (2.695)  (2.647) 
Social class, s s=1   0.625   0.624   0.607   0.595 
    (0.662)  (0.661)  (0.679)  (0.677) 
s=2   0.101   0.114  -0.211  -0.197 
  (0.628)  (0.627)  (0.645)  (0.645) 
s=3   0.701   0.722   0.901   0.934 
  (0.677)  (0.679)  (0.706)  (0.710) 
s=4   0.570   0.586   0.390   0.388 
  (0.620)  (0.618)  (0.634)  (0.631) 
s=5   0.609   0.602  -0.007  -0.012 
  (0.711)  (0.712)  (0.727)  (0.728) 
Poor health score   0.010   0.010   0.027   0.025 
    (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.037)  (0.036) 
Long-term self-emp  -0.809 ** -0.799 ** -0.906 ** -0.895 ** 
    (0.266)  (0.262)  (0.277)  (0.275) 
Female   -0.005  -0.027   0.044   0.023 
    (0.306)  (0.303)  (0.293)  (0.287) 
Cares for sick relative   0.459     0.459    0.712      0.731  
    (0.459)  (0.462)  (0.481)  (0.492) 
Spouse works    -0.432  -0.437  -0.636 * -0.655 * 
    (0.289)  (0.290)  (0.286)  (0.286) 
Vocational Quals.   0.115   0.107  -0.091  -0.121 
    (0.292)  (0.295)  (0.282)  (0.277) 
Years education   -0.052  -0.056  -0.059  -0.070     
    (0.064)  (0.065)  (0.068)  (0.069) 
Accrual    -1.637  -2.430 * -0.932  -2.702 * 
    (2.720)  (1.083)  (3.273)  (1.333) 
Accrual * Lifetime wealth -0.285    -0.886   
    (1.120)    (1.653)  
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− log likelihood  85.684  85.763  82.534  82.804 
Overall significance   87.296 ** 85.115 ** 101.780 ** 100.177 ** 
Hit rate (%)   77.665  78.680  79.695  78.680 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 (6) 6.422  5.952  3.756  4.936 
Fit:  Estrella 0.413   0.410  0.478  0.474 
  R2 - ML 0.354  0.352  0.403  0.400 
 
 
Notes:  
Sample size: 197 for all regressions.  
 
All variables are defined in the text, with Accrual and Lifetime Wealth each expressed in 
hundreds of thousands f pounds. 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, obtained using a sandwich style robust covariance 
estimator.  
 
* Indicates significance at 5%; ** indicates significance at 1%. Overall significance is a 
χ2 test of the joint significance of the coefficients; degrees of freedom are 19 in columns 
1a and 1b and 18 in columns 2a and 2b. Hit rate is the proportion of correct predictions, 
using a 50 per cent cut-off rule. The Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic evaluates divergence 
between actual and predicted values: a significant value indicates a large divergence. 
Estrella and R2-ML are “R2”-type goodness of fit statistics.  
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Table 3. Characteristics of the self-employed sample in 1994 disaggregated by job 
history: mean values 
 
             
    Employees in  “Long term”   P value 
     wave 1   self-employed  
    ____________ ____________ ______ 
Discrete variables  
 
Retired (Broad)  0.831   0.500   0.000 ** 
 (Narrow)  0.807   0.430   0.000 ** 
Married   0.819   0.833   0.797 
Disabled   0.470   0.351   0.093 
Female   0.398   0.237   0.016 * 
Spouse works   0.253   0.193   0.316 
Vocational Quals.  0.181   0.202   0.711 
Cares for sick relative  0.050   0.060   0.688 
 
Continuous variables  
 
Age    67.868   65.325   0.001 ** 
Poor health score  2.465   1.513   0.086 
ln(Ω)    11.394   11.802   0.000 ** 
ln(1+ΩR)   4.984   7.735   0.000 ** 
Social class scale  2.880   3.053   0.373 
Years education  10.096   10.518   0.137 
No. Children   2.241   2.368   0.567 
 
Job history variables  
 
No. jobs between waves 0.470   0.096   0.000 **   
part-time  0.337   0.044   0.000 ** 
full-time  0.133   0.053   0.187 
No. jobless spells between waves 
    0.386   0.018   0.000 ** 
 
 
Sample size   83   114 
 
 
Notes:  
Variables defined in the text. For asterisks, see Table 2.  
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Statistical tests: For continuous and job history variables, p-values are based on t-tests 
which are robust to unequal variances. For discrete variables, p-values are based on 
likelihood ratio χ2 tests.  
 
Source: The Retirement Survey. 
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Table 4. Determinants of employee retirement probabilities  
 
             
              Broad  ret. definition            Narrow ret.definition  .
           (3)         (4) 
  
Constant      0.474     0.382 
    (0.426)    (0.413) 
No. Children    -0.082 *   -0.068 
     (0.041)    (0.040) 
Disabled     0.109     0.153 
     (0.161)    (0.160) 
Married     0.234     0.198 
     (0.159)    (0.154) 
Linear age     29.965 **    22.157 **  
     (5.291)    (4.534) 
Quadratic age    -1.402    -5.733 
     (5.127)    (5.164) 
Social class, s s=1    -0.295    -0.336 
     (0.246)    (0.238) 
s=2   -0.146    -0.172 
   (0.234)    (0.230) 
s=3     0.093    -0.052 
   (0.241)    (0.234) 
s=4    0.226     0.082 
   (0.241)    (0.236) 
s=5    0.177     0.242 
   (0.383)    (0.377) 
Poor health score     0.061 *    0.062 * 
     (0.027)    (0.026) 
Long-term self-emp   -0.018    -0.114  
     (0.227)    (0.206) 
Female     0.392 **    0.376 ** 
     (0.145)    (0.140) 
Cares for sick relative     0.228     0.260  
     (0.262)    (0.254) 
Spouse works     -0.552 **   -0.564 ** 
     (0.143)    (0.142) 
Vocational Quals.   -0.083    -0.021   
     (0.166)    (0.162) 
Years education     0.0001    0.003 
     (0.034)    (0.033) 
Accrual      2.040     0.885 
     (1.219)    (1.241)
Page 39 of 88
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 
 
− log likelihood   301.341   316.137 
Overall significance    162.372 **   144.177 **  
Hit rate (%)    76.963    73.997 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 (8)  9.638    10.476 
Fit:  Estrella  0.273    0.243 
  R2 - ML  0.247    0.222 
 
 
Notes:  
Source: The Retirement Survey. Sample size: 573 for both regressions.  
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Table 5. Transition matrix of employment status  
 
Employment 
group 
 
Retired in 
1994 
Working 
employee in 
1994 
Working self-
employed in 
1994 
Total number, 
1988/89 
Retired in 
1988/89 
1393 41 7 1441 
Working 
employee in 
1988/89 
643 319 12 974 
Working self-
employed in 
1988/89 
73 4 57 134 
Total number, 
1994 
2109 304 76 2549 
 
Notes:  
Source: The Retirement Survey, 1994. 
 
The sample size of 76 working self-employed exceeds the 71 used in the estimation of (4) 
and (6), as 5 observations had to be dropped in those estimations owing to missing data 
on explanatory variables. 
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Table 6. Multinomial logit analysis of dynamic retirement and employment decisions 
 
             
               Working as an       Working as self-  
       employee by 1994       employed by 1994     .             
  
Dummy for  
retired in 1988/89   -1.640 **   -3.779 ** 
    (0.343)    (0.869) 
employee in 1988/89  -0.049     -3.128 ** 
    (0.337)    (0.626) 
No. Children    -0.009     -0.025 
     (0.031)    (0.028) 
Disabled    -0.216     0.957 
     (0.242)    (0.624) 
Married    -0.247    -0.310 
     (0.197)    (0.424) 
Linear age    -71.146 **   -60.597 **  
     (11.045)   (18.986) 
Quadratic age    -9.369    -6.415 
     (11.736)   (12.175) 
Social class, s s=1    -0.367    -0.896 
     (0.271)    (0.948) 
s=2   -0.148     0.010 
   (0.267)    (0.826) 
s=3    -0.393    -0.016 
   (0.276)    (0.869) 
s=4   -0.406    -0.494 
   (0.294)    (0.826) 
s=5   -0.525     0.229 
   (0.502)    (1.108) 
Poor health score    -0.008     -0.470 ** 
     (0.040)    (0.169) 
Female    -0.245      -0.255    
     (0.205)    (0.552) 
Cares for sick relative     0.008     0.053  
     (0.107)    (0.399) 
Vocational Quals.   -0.131     0.332   
     (0.181)    (0.395) 
Years education    -0.108 **   -0.090 
     (0.032)    (0.072) 
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− log likelihood     716.573 
Overall significance      753.930 **  
Hit rate (%)      85.833 
Pseudo-R2      0.345 
 
 
Notes:  
Sample size: 2047. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. The coefficients are 
log-odds ratios of being an employee or self-employed relative to retired in 1994. 
 
All explanatory variables take 1988/89 values. 
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Appendix  
 
Table A1. Earnings growth regressions used for imputing accrual values 
 
      
            Self-employed                       Employees         .
    Coefficient St. error  Coefficient St. error 
  
Constant     5.640 *  2.373   
Social class   -0.178 *  0.083     
Mixed job history    0.966 **  0.284   
Work hours     0.019 **  0.007    
Log earnings   -0.637 **   0.129   -0.403 **  0.074 
Linear age   -0.064    0.038    0.171 **  0.029 
Quadratic age       -0.002 **  0.000 
Female       -0.310 *     0.155 
Years education       -0.078 *     0.039     
Resides in South East        0.345 *  0.139 
 
 
Sample size    61      208 
σ2ω      0.763    0.884 
R2     0.441    0.270 
Overall significance: F   8.834 **   7.789 ** 
 
 
Notes:  
 
All explanatory variables measured at 1988/89 (Wave 1). Social class is that of the most 
recent job; Mixed job history is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual has 
had a job history with a mixture of paid employment and self-employment, and 0 
otherwise; and Resides in the South East and Female are also dummy variables. 
 
For asterisks, see notes to Table 2.  
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The Retirement Behaviour of the Self-employed
in Britain
Abstract
We analyse the retirement behaviour of older self-employed workers, using a
life cycle framework and a multinomial logit model of dynamic employment and
retirement choices. Using data from the two-wave Retirement Survey, we nd
that greater actual or potential earnings decrease the probability of retirement
among the self-employed. In contrast to employees, none of gender, health
or family circumstances appear to a¤ect self-employed retirement decisions.
The dynamic analysis reveals that relatively few employees and virtually no
retirees switch into self-employment in later life. The switches that do occur are
motivated less by attempts to use self-employment as a bridge job or stepping
stoneto full retirement, than by self-employment being a last resort for less
a­ uent workers with job histories of weak attachment to the labour market.
We compare self-employed and employee retirement behaviour, and discuss the
policy implications of our results.
1
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1 Introduction
This paper asks what determines the retirement behaviour of older self-employed
workers, and analyses the dynamic process of occupational and retirement choices in
later life. Specically, we search for the factors that explain when the self-employed
retire, who chooses to become and remain self-employed in later life, and di¤erences
in self-employed retirement behaviour compared with employees.
There are several reasons why this topic may be of interest to academics and
policy-makers. First, while retirement among employees has been heavily researched
in the academic literature, relatively little is known about the retirement behaviour
of the self-employed.1 Yet the self-employed face di¤erent institutional restrictions on
retirement and possibly also di¤erent incentives to retire, having higher labour force
participation rates and lower retirement rates than employees.2 This makes self-
employment a potentially interesting occupational choice to policy-makers concerned
about falling labour force participation rates, ageing populations, and the prospect
of substantial future publicly-funded pension liabilities (Disney, 2000; Bovenberg,
2003). It raises the prospect that schemes to promote self-employment among older
workers might full twin objectives: of increasing overall labour force participation
rates among older workers while stimulating the economy to become more competitive
and entrepreneurial (OECD, 2000).
Clearly a better understanding of self-employed retirement behaviour is needed be-
fore one can begin to sketch the outlines of possible self-employment schemes for older
workers. In particular, we require evidence about whether lower self-employed retire-
ment rates relative to employees can be explained in terms of di¤erent preferences for
leisure relative to work; di¤erent incentives; or di¤erent institutional structures. Re-
1For studies on employee retirement, see Stock and Wise (1990a, 1990b), Berkovic and Stern
(1991), Lumsdaine et al (1992), Blau (1994, 1998), Ruhm (1996), Rust and Phelan (1997), Samwick
(1998), Friedberg (1999, 2003), Gustman and Steinmeier (2000a, 2000b, 2001), Baker (2002) and
Blundell et al (2002). In contrast, we know of few studies of the labour market behaviour of older
self-employed workers, chiey the US studies of Quinn (1980), Fuchs (1982), and Bruce et al (2000).
2For example, while only about one tenth of the overall workforce is self-employed in the US and
UK, about one third of the workforce over 65 in each country is self-employed a proportion that
has been relatively stable over time (Iams, 1987; Moralee, 1988; Bruce et al, 2000).
2
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garding institutions, for example, the self-employed do not usually receive employer-
or government-provided sickness leave or benets. Instead they have to provide their
own pension and health-care coverage, which suggests that life cycle saving might
be an integral aspect of self-employed behaviour. At the same time, self-employed
workers in Britain do not face a mandatory retirement age, unlike employees. Their
incentives might also di¤er from those of employees. In particular, the self-employed
do not face the problem of timing their separation from a rm in order to maximise
the value of occupational pension rights. In contrast, this problem is of primary im-
portance for employees with occupational pension plans where it has spawned several
rich models, including nes based on option value (Stock and Wise, 1990a, 1990b)
and dynamic programming (Rust and Phelan, 1997) approaches. These models may
be less appropriate for the self-employed, in part because they abstract from non-
pension asset accumulation in order to focus on endogenous switches in and out of
pension schemes; and also because the self-employed do not face incentive problems
embodied in occupational pen plans, relying instead on personal savings to nance
their retirement behaviour. For this reason, we use a life cycle approach to model
self-employed retirement behaviour.
It turns out that the life cycle model used in this paper can shed some light on
the determinants of self-employed retirement behaviour. We estimate the model using
data from the two-wave British Retirement Survey  the best micro-data source cur-
rently available in Britain. Because the self-employed are a minority of the workforce,
the Retirement Survey yields only a relatively small sample size (just under 200); nev-
ertheless, it is still possible to generate some interesting new ndings. Among these,
we nd that the determinants of self-employed retirement di¤er from those impact-
ing on employee retirement  an important point which any policy intervention
should take account of. We supplement this analysis by briey exploring dynamic
occupational and retirement choices in later life, obtaining evidence about the char-
acteristics and subsequent retirement behaviour of older workers who switch into
self-employment. These are presumably the individuals that any self-employment
3
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scheme for older workers is likely to attract; and we discuss the implications of our
ndings for policies attempting to promote self-employment via such schemes. To
anticipate our ndings, we suggest that encouraging older workers to become and
remain self-employed is unlikely to succeed as most switchers into self-employment
in later life retire shortly thereafter. Also, advances in health care that help keep
older workers active appear to be a key aspect of any government initiatives to pro-
mote labour force participation and self-employment among older workers. Specially,
older employees in poor health are more likely to retire, and less likely to switch into
self-employment.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines a simple model of retirement
based on the life cycle hypothesis, together with its stochastic representation, and
suggestions for extensions to take account of possible sample selection bias in the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous occupational choice. Section 3
describes the data set, and the measurement of the explanatory variables. Section 4
presents and interprets the results. This comprises a static analysis of retirement
decisions, a dynamic analysis of transitions between di¤erent employment states over
the two waves of the Survey, and a sensitivity analysis. Section 5 discusses the policy
implications of our results, while Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The optimisation problem
The problem facing a specic agent aged t who plans to retire at age R and live until
age T is
max
c()
U =
Z R
t
expf (s  t)gu(c(s); 0) ds+
Z T
R
expf (s  t)gu(c(s); 1) ds

subject to
Z T
t
expf r(s  t)g c(s) ds = 
(R)
4
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where c() is consumption through time, s is an age index, u(; ) is an instananeous
utility function dened on consumption and retirement status respectively,  and r
are discount and interest rates, respectively, and 
(R) is current total lifetime wealth,
which is a function of retirement age. Lifetime wealth is the value of nancial, business
and housing assets plus the present value of all state pension (social security), personal
pension and labour incomes that an individual commands over the remainder of their
life. Its annuity stream is commonly referred to as permanent income.
We can solve this problem for the optimal consumption path c(; R) treating R
as parametric, and substitute the result back into the maximand to give the indirect
utility function, U(R). Then we can maximise the indirect utility function over R to
identify the optimal retirement age. Here we acknowledge that a key feature of being
self-employed is control over the retirement age. Using the envelope theorem gives
dU
dR
=   exp  (R  t)	r(c(t); R) +  d

dR
(1)
where r(c(t); R) := u(c(t); 1)   u(c(t); 0) is utility in retirement relative to work,
and  := dU=d
  0 is the marginal utility of wealth. We would usually expect
that r(c(t); R) > 0, i.e. the same amount of consumption is more enjoyable when
combined with leisure time (i.e. in retirement). Because of earnings opportunities in
work, we would also expect that d
=dR > 0, i.e. deferring retirement by one period
enhances the current stock of lifetime wealth by the amount of extra income generated
in that period.
The meaning of (1) is straightforward. The marginal utility of postponing the
retirement age R by a period involves foregoing utility from leisure with a neg-
ative impact but this is compensated by greater present and future consumption
possibilities a¤orded by greater lifetime wealth, which has a positive impact.
In order to analyse the determinants of an individuals current retirement status,
consider an individual who is considering retiring. By setting R = t in U they can
examine the utility that follows from retiring immediately. Whether or not immediate
5
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retirement is benecial is given by the sign of the derivative of U with respect to R,
namely
@U
dR

R=t
=  r(c(t); t) + 
R (2)
where 
R := d
=dR at R = t. For the reasons given above, both terms in (2) are
likely to be positive, and so there will be individuals for whom it is benecial to retire
(negative sign) and others for whom it is benecial to continue to work (positive
sign). Consequently it seems reasonable to model the probability that the individual
is retired at age t as some monotonic increasing function of the negative of (2), written
as
 = Pr

R  t = F (v) where v =   @U
dR

R=t
(3)
where F () is called the conditional mean functionin standard econometrics termi-
nology (Greene, 2003). We call this the retirement equation.
2.2 A statistical framework across individuals
For any individual we can observe retirement status, IR<t, where Ip is the indicator
function of the proposition p. We can also observe a number of covariates that
distinguish individuals from one another, x say. These covariates are associated with
the level of v through r c(t); t. We might write
v  f(x)  
R ;
where f is an unknown function which depends upon the unknown utility function
(taken to be a function of x), and 
R = d
=dR. Note the importance of an ap-
propriate specication of the vector x. It should capture person-specic preferences
relating to the work-leisure trade-o¤, to facilitate identication of any preference for
retirement (i.e., f(x)) separately from the incentives for retirement, given by 
R.
The incentive 
R can be measured directly if earnings from an extra period of
work are observed or imputed, as we explain in the next section. Note that 
R
6
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(which is henceforth called the accrual) is not necessarily 0 for retired individuals.
From the way in which we have solved the problem, the accrual is the incremental
change in my lifetime wealth were I currently to be working and decided not to retire
immediately but to defer for a small amount of time. It is true that this value may
be easier to compute for those currently working, but it is also clear that those who
have retired and can return to employment ought also to be making a calculation of
this kind.
So far  has been taken to be a constant, capturing the size of any substitution
e¤ect in retirement behaviour. More generally, we can allow for the possibility of
diminishing marginal utility of lifetime wealth by writing  = (
) = 0   1
,
where 0 > 0 ; 1  0 subject to (
)  0. Then 1 captures specically any in-
comee¤ect in retirement behaviour. In our empirical application, 
 can be measured
directly from micro data, while the sign of  can be checked in the results.
For the statistical treatment of this model, our data comprise the n tuples (i; xi;

i;
Ri), where i is the indicator function of retirement for individual i. We assume
that these tuples are exchangeable. We use the probit function for F and write
i := (v

i ), where () is the standard normal distribution function. Using linear
functionals for f as well as , our empirical model is
vi = 1 + x
T
i 1   (0   1
i)
Ri + i1 (4)
where i1 is an uncorrelated gaussian error term. The parameter vector  := (1; 1;
0; 1) can be estimated by maximising a standard probit log likelihood function
associated with (4). A testable prediction of the life-cycle model is that the accrual
has a negative e¤ect, and lifetime wealth a zero or positive e¤ect, on the probability
that a given individual is retired. Note that the life cycle model suggests that lifetime
wealth enters the retirement equation interactively rather than separately. The logic
is that the Lagrange multiplier  maps the accrual into retirement behaviour, since
 is the marginal utility of lifetime wealth. Allowing  to depend on lifetime wealth
7
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then gives rise to the interaction term in (4). Later we will test whether our empirical
results are sensitive to this aspect of the model specication.
An important question is whether there is unobservable heterogeneity with respect
to retirement status. Do the self-employed di¤er from employees in their retirement
behaviour in ways that cannot be captured by our covariates? Specically, might there
be unobservable variables that drive both retirement behaviour and the likelihood of
being self-employed? For example, perhaps very energetic individuals who enjoy
work and are therefore reluctant to retire are more likely to become self-employed.
To answer this question, we extend our statistical framework in the following way.
Consider the following probit selectionequation:
si = 2 + y
T
i 2 + i2 ; (5)
where i is self-employed (si = 1) if si  0, and is an employee (si = 0) if si < 0;
where yi is a vector of individual characteristics that bear on the occupational choice
decision, yi 6= xi in general; and where i2 is an uncorrelated gaussian error term,
such that i1; i2  BVN(0; 0; 1; 1; ). The key point is that (i; xi; 
i;
Ri) is only
observed for i if si = 1. The log-likelihood function for this model is
lnL() =
nX
i=1

isi ln2
 
1 + x
T
i 1   (0   1
i)
Ri; 2 + yTi 2; 

+si(1  i) ln2
   1   xTi 1 + (0   1
i)
Ri; 2 + yTi 2; 
 (1  si) ln
   2   yTi 2	 ; (6)
where 2(; ; ) denotes the bivariate normal distribution function. After estimating
the parameters  := (; 2; 2; ) by maximising (6), one can check for sample se-
lection by testing the hypothesis that  = 0. Thus controlling for sample selection
complements the observable heterogeneity in work-leisure preferences characterised
by f(x), with unobservable heterogeneity in these preferences.
8
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3 Data set and methodology
3.1 The Retirement Survey data set
We estimated the model outlined in the previous section using data from the British
Retirement Survey (RS). The RS is a rich two-wave data set containing individual-
and household-level information on personal and nancial characteristics, health and
labour market behaviour around the time of retirement. The rst wave contains
information from interviews conducted in 1988/89 with 3543 randomly selected re-
spondents who were aged between 55 and 69, together with 609 spouses outside this
age range. The second wave took place in 1994, which involved re-interviewing about
two thirds of the original respondents and spouses in a single face-to-face survey. The
other one third of respondents either did not respond to the second interview or had
died between the two waves. Apart from being older on average, the non-responders
do not appear to be substantially di¤erent from those who did participate in the sec-
ond wave (Attanasio and Emmerson, 2001). Data from both waves are used in the
current paper, with an emphasis on explaining retirement behaviour and occupational
choices in the second wave.
An individual is dened as self-employed in the RS if their most recent job was
in self-employment rather than paid employment. Of the total sample, complete
information was available for 197 self-employed individuals.3 This is a smaller sample
than is often used for studying employee retirement behaviour, reecting the fact
that only a minority of the workforce is self-employed. It is also smaller than samples
on self-employed workers that have been drawn from the US Retirement History
Survey, including those of Fuchs (1982) (n = 443) and Quinn (1980) (n = 836). The
limitations of using a relatively small sample size should therefore be borne in mind
when the empirical results are discussed.
3Of the 1994 sample, 282 individuals were self-employed, of whom 85 were omitted because there
was incomplete information about one or more component of their lifetime wealth (see below). The
omitted individuals did not appear to have di¤erent observable characteristics to those remaining in
the sample.
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The RS contains several alternative denitions of retirement. One is a broad
denition, whereby an individual is retired if they consider themselves to be so. Self-
reported denitions of this kind may be criticised on the grounds that some indi-
viduals misclassify themselves. For example, it can be objected that some of the
self-employed respondents are not actually self-employed at all, but are claiming
self-employment status (e.g., consultancy) to justify retirement to their peers. We
will therefore also utilise in our empirical work an additional, narrower, denition of
retirement. To be dened as retired under this denition, an individual must be out
of work and not seeking work, and must cite being retired as the main reason for not
working.4
To give some idea of the di¤erence between the measures, some 64% of the sample
are retired on the broad denition, compared with 59% on the narrow denition. The
proportion retired on the broad denition compares with 81% of all individuals in
the 1994 RS (Tanner, 1998). This reects the greater tendency of the self-employed
compared with employees to work beyond the statutory retirement age, a well-known
stylised factin the UK (Tanner, 1997) and US (Quinn, 1980; Fuchs, 1982; Sickles
and Taubman, 1986; Bruce et al, 2000). Indeed, according to the 1994 RS, 73% of
the self-employed in 1994 worked beyond the statutory employee retirement age of 65
for men and 60 for women.
The RS also enables the researcher to compute lifetime wealth 
, and the ac-
crual, 
R. We next discuss issues involved in measuring these two variables, before
describing the other explanatory variables used in the empirical work.
3.2 Explanatory variables: Lifetime wealth and accrual
Because the computation of lifetime wealth imposes considerable demands on micro
data, most previous studies have tended to consider the e¤ects of just a subset of its
4Several other retirement denitions have also been used in the literature, including ones based on
a discontinuous drop in wages or hours worked (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1984; Burtless and Mo¢ tt,
1985), or whether individuals receive low or zero wages (Honig and Hanoch, 1985). Information on
work hours is unavailable in the RS, ruling out use of the rst denition; and many self-employed
report zero incomes (Parker, 1997) making the second denition problematic.
10
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components on retirement.5 In contrast, the RS enables a comprehensive measure
of lifetime wealth to be computed, encompassing many of those recommended in the
literature (see, e.g. Wol¤, 1987; Zagorsky 1999). As well as housing and nancial
wealth, it is also possible to calculate capitalised values of state pension, private and
occupational pension entitlements; future expected earnings; and expected future
business resale values. The RS contains detailed data on all of these sources of
lifetime wealth, which is computed at the individual level.
To save space, we give only a broad outline of the construction of lifetime wealth
(see Parker, 2003, for a fuller explanation). Information about house values and
mortgage debts outstanding in 1994 was used to calculate net housing wealth. Be-
cause of the wide coverage of nancial assets in the RS, a comprehensive measure
of nancial wealth was straightforward to compute from the 1994 data. More work
was required to compute state, private and occupational pension wealth. Fortunately,
the RS contains a wealth of information across the two waves that make relatively
rened estimates possible. This includes detailed information about income indexa-
tion formulae and other rules and provisions of each individual pension scheme. Also,
observed pension incomes in the rst wave enabled pension entitlements in the second
wave to be estimated for individuals with incomplete pension records, by matching
individuals with missing data in wave 2 to cases with observed data in both waves.
The longitudinal nature of the RS, and its detailed le of job history data, also enables
the researcher to infer current and future earnings of those working and the imputed
values of those no longer working (see below for further details). Recalling that life-
time wealth measures ones control over total current and future resources, earnings
wealth was estimated by applying average actual income growth rates to actual or im-
puted 1994 incomes until the expected age of retirement (see below). Finally, business
5For example, Diamond and Hausman (1984), Honig and Hanoch (1985) and Burtless (1986)
considered only nancial wealth. Samwick (1998) also included private and state (social security)
pension wealth; the latter alone was used by Gordon and Blinder (1980), McCarty (1990) and
Reimers and Honig (1996). Pension wealth also appears in Mitchell and Fields (1984), who ad-
ditionally used the NPV of labour market incomes (earnings wealth). Hogarth (1988) used just
earnings wealth. See Hurd (1990) for a discussion of all of these sources of lifetime wealth. Many
more authors analyse only single-period income ows, from investments, pensions and earnings,
without accounting for future values of these ows.
11
Page 55 of 88
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
wealth was computed from responses to the RS question about the expected value
of businesses and the expected sale date. In the computation of the lifetime wealth
components, all future income ows were capitalised using a discount rate of 3%; and
individual-specic life expectancy tables were used in the capitalisation calculations.
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE]
Because the composition of lifetime wealth might be of independent interest, Ta-
ble 1 summarises the holdings of each component, as well as the aggregate value, and
the accrual variable (see below) for our self-employed sample. Despite some limita-
tions  including the common use of banded data from which point estimates are
imputed, and the small number of respondents claiming business wealth6  the RS
has the advantage of containing comprehensive data on current wealth and future
entitlements. Also, its sample wealth component distributions match those published
in national accounts data (Disney et al, 1997). We would suggest however that earn-
ings wealth should be treated with some caution because 1994 earnings were uprated
to estimate post-1994 values by using the observed average self-employment income
growth rate, obtained from National Accounts data. The use of a common rather
than an individual-specic income growth rate estimated between the waves was mo-
tivated by the di¤erent macroeconomic conditions prevailing after 1994 (high growth)
compared with 1988/8994 (recession and low growth). While this is likely to avoid
the use of inappropriate growth rates, it is however also likely to understate the true
variability of earnings within the sample. Note also that if the self-employed under-
report their incomes (Pissarides and Weber, 1989), the e¤ect of this cannot be easily
removed from the present value calculation.
Despite these limitations, we felt it appropriate to retain earnings wealth in the
analysis. As pointed out by Baker et al (2003), lifetime earnings might capture het-
erogeneity in work preferences and so assist with identication in the cross-sectional
6The small proportion of respondents claiming any business wealth in Table 1 partly reects
a large number of missing values to responses to this variable, which may be because many self-
employed people do not know what their business is worth. However, it might also partly reect the
fact that many self-employed workers are in occupations like construction, trades and crafts, sales,
and vehicle maintenance in which there are virtually no tangible assets to sell.
12
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analysis.
Turning next to the accrual, recall that this is dened as the incremental value
from deferring retirement for another period. For the self-employed, earnings are the
only component of lifetime wealth that is directly a¤ected by such a deferral. This
is because neither early retirement provisions in occupational pensions nor SERPS
entitlements are relevant for the self-employed; private pension annuities are invariant
to the retirement date; nancial and housing wealth are not directly a¤ected by
retirement; and the present value of the state (social security) pension in Britain is
designed to be approximately invariant to the retirement age.7
A practical di¢ culty is imputing 1994 earnings, ei94, for individuals for whom
no earnings were observed in 1994. Imputation involved estimating earnings growth
rates, gi94, conditioned on a vector of explanatory variables observed in 1988/89,
denoted by hi88. By the properties of the lognormal distribution (treating this as a
convenient approximation to the distribution of earnings),
gi94 = ln ei94   ln ei88 = hTi88 + !i94 (7)
) E(ei94) = ei88: exp
 
hTi88^ + ^
2
!=2

; (8)
where !i94  N
 
0; 2!

is a stochastic disturbance and  is a vector of coe¢ cients.8
In order to impute earnings as accurately as possible, a general-to-specic regression
search was used to compute ^. The appendix contains details of the regression results.
Results are also given for employees, which are used later for comparative purposes.
The bottom two rows of Table 1 disaggregate the accrual for retired and non-
retired respondents. These data indicate that the accrual distribution for non-retirees
7To be sure, one can think of indirect e¤ects on resources from deferral of retirement, e.g., if
individuals move house when they retire, so that uctuations in house prices become relevant. But
most individuals do not move house at the same time as they retire. Similarly, businesses are not
necessarily sold at the time of retirement and realised as an accrual, e.g., because some family
businesses are bequeathed to successors. As noted above, only 4% of self-employed respondents in
the RS held any net business wealth in any case.
8This imputation procedure enjoys an advantage over that of Meghir and Whitehouse (1997)
by exploiting the 1988/89 wave of the RS, which was unavailable to those authors. Clearly, it is
very problematic to impute 1994 earnings for those individuals without recorded earnings even in
1988/89, something we therefore do not attempt.
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rst order stochastically dominates that of retirees. Checks revealed that this is not
merely an artefact of our imputation procedure, as very similar results were obtained
when actual earnings of non-retirees in 1994 were replaced with their imputed values
and comparisons were made with imputed earnings of retirees. Thus the di¤erent
accrual values seem to reect genuine di¤erences in earnings opportunities.
3.3 Other explanatory variables
Several non-pecuniary variables, x, are likely to a¤ect preferences for leisure relative
to work, and thereby the probability of retirement, . One such variable is age, which
is expected to increase the marginal value of leisure, as the remaining time to enjoy it
diminishes. On the other hand, cohort e¤ects might confound this prediction, e.g., if
older cohorts work harder than their younger counterparts. To allow for a non-linear
e¤ect in retirement-age patterns, the age data were represented by an orthogonal basis
of degree two. The use of orthogonal polynomials is necessary because the limited
range of the age data would result in strong collinearity if simply ageand age2were
used. Therefore we transform the data onto orthogonal linear and quadratic scales.
For our sample the transformations are
 1(x) =  0:8850 + 0:0133x
 2(x) = 5:3681  0:1650x+ 0:0013x2
(9)
which have the usual properties that
nX
i=1
 1(xi) =
nX
i=1
 2(xi) =
nX
i=1
 1(xi) 2(xi) = 0
nX
i=1

 1(xi)
	2
=
nX
i=1

 2(xi)
	2
= 1
(10)
when xi is the age of individual i in the sample of size n.
An aspect of ageing that is of special interest in the present study is the bridge
retirement process, whereby employees may choose self-employment as a stepping
14
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stone to full retirement. We investigate this issue by checking whether the long
termself-employed have di¤erent retirement patterns compared with employees who
switched into self-employment fairly recently. For this reason, a dummy variable
for whether the individual was self-employed in the rst wave of the RS (i.e., in
1988/89) is also included.9 In our sample 57.9% were dened as long-term self-
employed according to this denition.
A consideration that often arises when analysing behaviour of older workers is
health. An individuals own poor health, or that of a relative they look after, might
reduce their ability to run a business, and increase the value of spending time away
from work. Poor health is measured using two variables. One is a weighted score (on a
scale from 0 to 21) of 13 di¤erent disabilities relating to inability to undertake essential
tasks, termed Activities of Daily Living (see Grundy and Glaser, 1997, for details).
The second is a dummy variable for whether the individual is classied as disabled,
where disability is dened as any restriction or lack (resulting from an impairment)
of ability to perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal
for a human being.10 In our sample 40% were classied as disabled, and the mean
poor health score was 1:91.11 A dummy variable is also dened for whether individuals
care for a sick relative, since this might increase the relative disutility of work relative
to leisure, the latter including time spent in the caring capacity. Carers comprised
5.6% of the sample.
Other relevant family-level variables are the number of children living in the house-
hold (the mean number in the sample was 2.31), and whether the individual was mar-
ried (82.7% were). As above, these variables might be expected to increase the desire
9See also Blau (1994), who stresses the importance of job history variables. While work status
six years previously might not give a precise idea of long termwork status in the conventional
(i.e., employee) sense, the low survival rates of small businesses suggests that this interpretation is
not untenable for the self-employed. It will be seen below that this variable is indeed an informative
discriminator among the self-employed.
10These health measures are based on self-assessed information. Self-reported health measures
have been criticised in the literature because people can blame being out of the labour force on poor
health (Parsons, 1982). But Bound (1991) points out that self-reported measures may be no worse
than objectivemeasures.
11The relatively large number of disabled respondents might either reect the more dangerous
working conditions of the self-employed (as observed by OECD, 2000), or an institutional bias
against employees with disabilities.
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for leisure (retirement) relative to continued work. Finally, a family-level dummy vari-
able that is expected to work in the other direction is whether the individuals spouse
is working (see Blau, 1998). Although we do not explicitly consider issues of joint
retirement in this paper,12 if leisure is a joint household good, then having a working
spouse might be expected to reduce the individuals surplus of post-retirement util-
ity over pre-retirement utility, so decreasing the probability of retirement. In fact,
it is unclear whether joint retirement should be more or less important for the self-
employed relative to employees. On one hand, the self-employed have more variable
incomes than employees do, and so can be expected to benet more from household
income smoothing derived from spousal income. Hence the retirement of a previously
working spouse might yield an extra incentive for a self-employed person to retire,
as the benet from income smoothing is removed. On the other hand, if older self-
employed workers are less well o¤ on average than their employee counterparts (see
below), then retirement of a spouse might make it all the more important that the
self-employed person continues to work in order to safeguard household income.
Several other explanatory variables are also included in the econometric specica-
tion. One is a dummy for female gender (comprising 30% of the sample) which can
be used to isolate any di¤erences in preferences between the sexes in self-employed
retirement behaviour. Two others were the number of years of schooling (the sam-
ple mean was 10:3), and a dummy variable for whether the individual had acquired
vocational qualications (19.3% of the sample had). Both of these variables might
capture non-pecuniary aspects of jobs that make retirement relatively more or less
attractive to continued work. So might social class, which is inferred in the RS from
details about an individuals current or most recent occupation, narrowly dened. It
is measured on an ordinal scale from 0 to 5, with 0 being the lowestclass. This was
re-coded as ve dummy variables to allow for the possibility of a non-monotonic or
non-linear response to social class. In our sample 48.1% belonged to one of the top
12See, e.g., Hurd (1990), Zweimuller et al (1996), Gustman and Steinmeier (2000b) and Baker
(2002). It seems justied not to model joint retirement explicitly in the present context because, as
pointed out by Tanner (1997), the clear majority of couples [in the RS] do not retire at the same
time. (p. 48).
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two social classes.
4 Estimation and Results
This section is divided into three parts. In the rst, we estimate the static retirement
equation (4), discuss the results, and compare them with those obtained for an em-
ployee sample taken from the RS. We also address issues of sample selection here. In
the second part, we provide a dynamic analysis of retirement behaviour around the
time of retirement, exploring the transitions between self-employment, employment,
and retirement over the two waves of the RS. The third part contains a sensitivity
analysis, to provide some checks on the robustness of the results.
4.1 Static analysis of retirement
We rst estimated (4) by maximum likelihood. Table 2 contains the results for both
broad (columns 1a and 1b) and narrow (columns 2a and 2b) denitions of retirement.
All of the regressions presented in Table 2 are highly signicant and data congruent,
with good hit rates and insignicant Hosmer-Lemeshow statistics.13
Columns 1a and 2a measure both substitution (accrual) and income (accrual times
lifetime wealth) e¤ects. The latter are insignicantly di¤erent from zero, implying
that 1  0. This suggests that the marginal utility of lifetime wealth is approxi-
mately constant for the self-employed, so that retirement and lifetime wealth are not
strongly linked (see also Gustman and Steinmeier, 2001; and Blundell et al, 2002,
for similar ndings based on reduced form studies of employees). Imposing this re-
striction yields the results in columns 1b and 2b, in which the accrual now has a
signicant negative e¤ect on retirement decisions. This result is in accordance with
the life cycle model, implying that greater actual or potential earnings (the substitu-
tion e¤ect) delay retirement. These ndings are consistent with those of Meghir and
13All estimations were performed using LIMDEP 8.0, using robust standard errors derived from
a sandwich-style covariance matrix estimator. See the notes to Table 2 and Greene (2002, 2003) for
further details about these probit model performance measures.
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Whitehouse (1997), who found using RS data that higher imputed earnings tend to
delay job exits among employees.14
[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE]
Apart from the accrual, only two other explanatory variables are consistently
signicant for both denitions of retirement. One is age, which has a strong positive
e¤ect on retirement probabilities as expected, suggesting that the marginal utility of
leisure relative to work increases as self-employed individuals get older. The other is
long term self-employment status, suggesting that the long-term self-employed have
a lower probability of retirement at every age. Two other explanatory variables are
statistically signicant using the narrower denition of retirement. These are age
squared, which has a negative e¤ect implying that the impact of age on retirement
diminishes with age, and having a working spouse. The latter provides some limited
support for the notion that retirement is a joint decision for couples.
Why do comparatively recent entrants to self-employment have a higher tendency
to retire soon afterwards? One possibility is that some former employees purposefully
choose self-employment as a bridge job, or form of partial retirement, as a stepping
stone to full retirement (Quinn, 1980). Another possibility is that these employees
are marginal or peripheral workers who are pushed into self-employment as a last
resort. In an attempt to discriminate between these two explanations, we examined
the detailed inter-wave job history les that accompany the RS. Table 3 presents
summary statistics that distinguish between the long termself-employed (i.e., who
were self-employed in both waves), and the Wave 2 self-employees who were employ-
ees in Wave 1. We call the latter switchers. The results suggest that switchers
have a signicantly and substantially greater incidence of part-time jobs and jobless
spells between the waves than the long-term self-employed do. They also have sig-
nicantly and substantially lower wealth and actual or potential earnings; are older
on average; and have a higher unconditional probability of retirement. This suggests
14The reason for the signicance of 
R once 
R
 is dropped is partly explained by the high
correlation coe¢ cient of 0:838 between the two variables. Therefore our preferred results are columns
1b and 2b, which remove this source of collinearity.
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(tentatively given the relatively small sample sizes) that switchers have a relatively
weak attachment to the labour market with less secure job matches, drifting in and
out of temporary and part-time work of several kinds, including self-employment.
While part-time work is not inconsistent with the notion of bridge jobs (Fuchs, 1982),
the fact that switchers have so many more short-term jobs and are worse o¤ than the
long-term self-employed suggests that some pushfactors are present too. Switchers
certainly cannot be characterised as a­ uent employees who are voluntarily downsizing
their jobs as a prelude to full retirement. In short, new self-employment jobs among
older British workers seem to be less a form of partial retirement than a concerted
e¤ort by vulnerable workers to remain active in the workforce.
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
There is also some weak evidence from Table 3 that switchers have somewhat
worse health than the long term self-employed. They are also more likely to be
female. But, as is evident from Table 2, neither health nor gender exerts a signicant
impact on the retirement decision in 1994 once long-term self-employment status is
controlled for. This nding contrasts with previous evidence for employees.15 It also
contrasts with our own ndings based on a sample of employees taken from the RS
(the fact that this is also a relatively small sample might suggest that sample sizes
are not driving the self-employed results). Table 4 r plicates for our RS sample of
employees the specications reported in columns 1b and 2b of Table 2. The results
from this exercise will be discussed more fully below; for now, it su¢ ces to observe
that among employees, females and those with worse health are signicantly more
likely to retire. For the self-employed, however, these results suggest that preferences
are similar across genders, even while incentives di¤er (self-employed females have
signicantly lower accruals than self-employed males). Second, regarding health, it is
possible that the self-employed are used to working when they are ill, as a consequence
of their inability to access employer sick pay or sickness insurance schemes (Perry and
15For US evidence, see Burkhauser (1979), Gordon and Blinder (1980), Hogarth (1988), Berkovec
and Stern (1991) and Samwick (1998). For UK evidence see Meghir and Whitehouse (1997). Siddiqui
(1997) provides German evidence.
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Rosen, 2004). And, the exibility of self-employment might provide workers with ways
of circumventing any physical limitations they face. Of course, these are only tentative
hypotheses, and further research based on larger samples or more detailed case studies
is needed to dig deeper into the underlying causes of the phenomenon. Nevertheless, it
seems possible to conclude that institutional di¤erences might explain why employee
retirement behaviour is more sensitive to gender, health, and age.16 Female employees
have an earlier mandatory retirement age than males; early retirement schemes within
corporations can enable employers to remove workers who take excessive sick leave;
and there are binding mandatory retirement age limits. None of these provisions
apply to the self-employed.
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE]
Comparing columns 1b and 2b of Table 2 with columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 re-
veals other di¤erences in the determinants of retirement between employed and self-
employed Britons. Neither employment status in 1988/89 nor the accrual are sig-
nicant for employees whereas they are for the self-employed.17 And some aspects
of family structure appear to matter more for employees than for the self-employed.
In particular, the presence of children and a working spouse appear to decrease the
likelihood that employees will retire, while these variables are less important for the
self-employed.
Finally, we consider what the results so far tell us about why the self-employed
retire later on average than employees do. The evidence points strongly to long-
16Note that the age-retirement relationship is approximately linear for employees, without a signif-
icant diminishing e¤ect as was found for the self-employed in Table 2; and the size of the coe¢ cients
on linear age for employees are approximately double those estimated for the self-employed.
17Note, however, that the accrualin Table 4 should really be regarded simply as actual or imputed
earnings for employees. (They were calculated in the same way as for the self-employed see the
last columns of Table A1 in the appendix.) A true accrual for employees should also include the
value of occupational rights conditional on the date of retirement (Blundell et al, 2002). Therefore
the results in Table 4 a¤ord an illustrative comparison only, and are certainly not intended as a
denitive model of employee retirement a task that goes beyond the scope of the present article
(see Meghir and Whitehouse, 1997; Blundell et al, 2002; Bingley and Lanot, 2004). Even so, accrual
values are higher for employees than for the self-employed: the absolute t-statistic for di¤erences
in ln(1 + 
R) between the two occupations is 6:239. Even allowing for income under-reporting by
the self-employed of 30% (Pissarides and Weber, 1989) does not change this result, merely reducing
the t-statistic to 4:675. As noted above, part of the reason for earlier retirement by employees no
doubt reects incentives for early retirement embodied in occupational pension schemes (Disney et
al, 1994), which we do not attempt to quantify here.
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term self-employment status as a central part of the answer. In particular, if we
remove the long-term self-employed from the self-employed sample, the proportion of
the self-employed switchersfrom employment in 1988/89 who are retired under the
broad denition is 83%: a very similar proportion to that of employees (see Table 3
and Section 3, respectively). In contrast, the proportion of long-term self-employed
who are retired is only 50% (Table 3). This is where the root of the di¤erence be-
tween paid employment and self-employment retirement rates seems to lie. It appears
to have little to do with unobserved heterogeneity of the self-employed (sample se-
lection), since estimation of (6) yielded ^ = 0:036 (standard error = 3:063).18 So
while these ndings cannot denitively exclude the possibility of unobservable het-
erogeneity, they certainly provide no support for the notion that people who select
into self-employment are systematically di¤erent with respect to latent preferences
for work relative to retirement.
4.2 Dynamic analysis of retirement
The two-wave nature of the RS makes it possible to analyse transitions between three
labour market states: working in self-employment, working in paid employment, and
being retired. An analysis of this issue is helpful because it sheds light on the dynamics
of retirement, and puts the results for the self-employed into a broader perspective.
One can identify the factors that determine transitions between the two waves of
the panel by generalising the binary choice model (5) into a three-state multinomial
logit:
Pr

si94 = j

=
expfyTi88jgP2
m=0 expfyTi88mg
j = 0; 1; 2 ; (11)
18In estimating (6) by FIML, the y variables used in the selection equation (5) include all of those
used in (4), but measured at 1988/89 (rather than at 1994) values. Complete results are available
from the authors on request.
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where
si94 :=
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
0 if i is retired by 1994
1 if i is working as an employee by 1994
2 if i is working as self-employed by 1994
The j are vectors of coe¢ cients for each employment group j, and yi88 is a vector
of explanatory variables observed in 1988/89. Following conventional practice, we
identify the parameters of this model by imposing the vector normalisation 0 = 0.
Table 5 presents the matrix of transitions between each employment group.19 It
shows that the largest number of transitions is from any kind of work to retirement.
One quarter of the working self-employed in 1994 came from retirement or paid em-
ployment in 1988/89, while there were very few transitions from self-employment to
paid employment between the waves. However, only 3.6% [=12/331] of working em-
ployees in 1988/89 who continued to work in 1994 switched to self-employment over
the 5 year interval  a lower switching rate than reported in previous US studies.20
Detailed examination of the job history les identied a further 24 employees in Wave
1 who tried self-employment at some time between the two waves but who were re-
tired by 1994. Thus while there is some evidence of transitions between employment
groups generally, and into self-employment specically, the numbers involved appear
to be fairly modest.
[INSERT TABLES 5 & 6 AROUND HERE]
To explore the matter further, we estimated (11) using data from both waves of
the RS. We utilised a similar specication to that used elsewhere in the paper, apart
from excluding a working spouse variable (unavailable in 1988/89), and including
dummies for employment status in Wave 1. The results appear in Table 6. Even
after controlling for observable characteristics, most of the explanatory power comes
from strong persistence in occupational choices. Interestingly, Table 6 indicates a
19One could also look at transitions into and out of unemployment, but the sample sizes are not
large enough to enable a robust analysis to be performed.
20Fuchs (1982) and Bruce et al (2000) each reported a two-year switching rate of 4%.
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negative e¤ect from poor health on participation in self-employment (but not paid
employment), suggesting that unhealthy respondents in Wave 1 prefer to retire than
to switch into self-employment later in life. In contrast, as we found earlier, poor
health does not appear to hasten retirement among those who have already chosen
self-employment.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
It is desirable to check the robustness of our results. We did so in several ways. First,
we tried an alternative specication of the retirement probit in which the interaction
term 
R
 was replaced by 
, thereby conditioning i on 
R and 
 separately (as in,
e.g., Blundell et al, 2002). The results were very similar to those reported in Table 2,
with the coe¢ cient on 
 still being statistically insignicant.
Second, we checked the sensitivity of our results to di¤erent accrual imputation
methods. For example, we applied a common (average) self-employment earnings-
growth rate to all respondents with observed Wave 1 earnings but no Wave 2 earnings,
instead of the individual-specic earnings growth rates estimated in the appendix.
Results were qualitatively the same as those in Table 2.
Third, we checked whether the quadratic e¤ects of age on self-employed retirement
behaviour captured any peaks in the data at ages 60 and 65 (the female and male
mandatory retirement ages for employees in Britain). No e¤ects were found when two
dummies were included: a Wald test statistic of 2(2) = 1:49 was unable to reject
the null hypothesis of insignicance. We also checked for outliers and identied seven
observations with especially large accrual values, but removing them did not change
the results in any noticeable way.
Fourth, we asked whether pooling self-employed and employee observations, makes
any di¤erence to the results. We investigated this question by interacting all variables
and the constant term with a dummy for self-employment status. This did not
change any of the ndings. A joint test of signicant di¤erences between the two
occupational groups was upheld: a Wald test statistic of 2(18) = 68:82 rejected the
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null hypothesis of a common specication.
Finally, we checked whether an intercept dummy was su¢ cient to capture gender
di¤erences in self-employed retirement behaviour. We did so by testing the explana-
tory power of a full set of gender and variable interaction terms. A Wald statistic
of 2(17) = 16:83 failed to reject the null hypothesis that separate specications are
unnecessary.
5 Policy discussion
Why might a better understanding of self-employment retirement behaviour matter to
policy makers? In this section, we shall briey address this question, on the working
assumption that the government seeks to encourage labour force participation among
older workers, while also seeking to promote self-employment separately as part of a
general pro-enterprise stance.
One possible reason for the policy elevance of this research is that average re-
tirement ages are substantially higher in self-employment than in paid employment,
implying that encouraging older retired or unemployed employees to become self-
employed could stimulate greater aggregate labour force participation. Second, know-
ing why some individuals choose to become self-employed in later life might also as-
sist policy-makers in determining the appropriate structure of any self-employment
or business start-up scheme targeted at older workers. An important related issue is
the duration of job spells among those switching into self-employment in later life. In
addition, governments might be interested in discovering whether, once workers are
self-employed, there is anything they can do to keep them working there rather than
retiring  again, as part of a labour force participation policy.
Regarding appropriate forms of policy intervention, it is important to bear in
mind the results from our dynamic analysis which illustrated the persistence of oc-
cupational and participation choices in later life. Specically, it would seem that a
policy of encouraging older workers to become self-employed is unlikely to be success-
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ful. More generally, safeguarding workershealth appears to be an important aspect
of keeping more people in work. Interestingly, the mechanisms appear to be di¤erent
for employees and the self-employed. For employees, poor health increases the prob-
ability of retirement. While we could not nd a similar e¤ect for the self-employed,
we saw that individuals in poor health are signicantly less likely to choose a spell of
self-employment in later life. Therefore advances in health-care that help keep older
workers active appear to be a key aspect of any government initiatives to promote
labour force participation and self-employment among older workers.
When we look at the characteristics of those employees who switch into self-
employment in later life, other policy implications emerge. Only a limited number
of older working employees switch into self-employment. Of those that do, few of
them fall into the category of a­ uent workers using it as a bridge job to make a
gentle transition to full retirement; most are peripheral workers with limited nancial
means who are engaged in a succession of short term and often part time jobs. If
blanket policies were to be devised to make it easier for employees to become self-
employed, our results suggest that these types of worker are the most likely to take up
the policy. Unfortunately, relatively few of them end up creating long-lived businesses,
being much more likely to retire than are established business owners who have been
self-employed for a long time. Therefore it is not clear what would be gained by
a policy that encouraged such workers to enter self-employment a point that has
added force as peripheral workers have also been identied as the most di¢ cult to
assist in unemployment-to-self-employment start-up programmes (Bendick and Egan,
1987). Amore promising route might be job skill programmes and managerial training
programmes dedicated to self-employed workers specically (Devaney and Kim, 2003).
And longer-term self-employment policies also look promising, as workers who persist
with self-employment have the lowest average retirement rates of all workers.
Another class of policy interventions might seek to operate on the margin of
keeping self-employed individuals in work rather than retiring. Any policies of this
kind need to recognise that the self-employed exhibit di¤erent retirement behaviour
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than employees, although our ndings are necessarily tentative given the relatively
small size (197) of our sample. Because higher earnings around retirement seem to
deter retirement by the self-employed, maintaining or cutting current levels of income
tax might help sustain continued workforce participation by these individuals. But
our results furnish few other concrete suggestions for policies that would also work
towards this end.
6 Conclusion
Several ndings emerge from this enquiry into the retirement behaviour of British
self-employed workers based on Retirement Survey (RS) data. First, estimation of a
simple life-cycle model identied a few signicant determinants of self-employed re-
tirement behaviour. Specically, higher earnings around retirement decrease the prob-
ability of retirement, while age increases it. Also, self-employed individuals who were
self-employed six years previously (the long termself-employed) are signicantly less
likely to retire than those who were not. The switchersinto self-employment in later
life do not resemble a­ uent employees downsizing to enjoy a gentle transition to full
retirement. Instead, they tend to be marginal workers with unstable job histories
and limited means, some of whom apparently turn to self-employment as a last resort
before nally retiring. Retirement rates were found to be similar for switchers and
employees who retired instead. The main di¤erence between the self-employed and
employees is therefore between the long term self-employed and employees. Our suc-
cess in nding some signicant determinants of self-employed retirement behaviour
is reassuring in view of the well-documented heterogeneity of the self-employed, and
the inability of researchers to explain other aspects of their labour supply behaviour
(Rees and Shah, 1994).
Second, several variables that might have been expected to a¤ect self-employed
retirement propensities turned out to be statistically insignicant. These include poor
health and gender, which both signicantly a¤ect employee retirement behaviour. Al-
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though the small self-employed sample size used here might explain this result, other
explanations grounded in institutional di¤erences are also tenable. These include
mandatory employee retirement ages that come earlier for females than for males,
and government- and employer-provided sickness benets. None of these provisions
apply to the self-employed.
Third, our dynamic analysis identied only a limited number of transitions be-
tween di¤erent labour market states among older workers, with persistence in retire-
ment, paid employment and self-employment being the norm. A greater proportion of
older employees made a transition to self-employment than the other way round, but
this amounted to only 3.6% of all older employees over a 5 year time horizon. We also
found that while poor health does not a¤ect the retirement behaviour of older self-
employed workers directly, it does signicantly decrease the probability that workers
will move into this kind of work.
The policy implications of our ndings can be summarised as follows. First, the
scope for government to encourage greater labour force participation among older
workers by promoting self-employment as a vehicle may be quite limited. The per-
sistence of employment choices in later life, and the nding that only the long-term
self-employed retire signicantly later than employees do, are the reasons for cau-
tion in this regard. Second, policies to promote bett r health among older workers
are likely to a¤ect the self-employed mainly by operating on the occupational choice
margin, whereas for employees the policy would mainly work by postponing retire-
ment.
Clearly, much remains to be done to rene the analysis and the policy recom-
mendations advanced here, and to dig more deeply into the nature of employment
transitions in later life. The availability of more high quality longitudinal data 
such as the new English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing21  will be an integral part
of this research agenda.
21See http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/ndingData/snDescription.asp?sn=5050
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Table 1. Summary statistics of lifetime wealth and the accrual 
 
 
     Non-   Quantiles    
     zero min.  25%     Median    75%   max. 
     (%) 
 
Sources of wealth § 
 
Housing (35.59 %)   84 0 31939      37297     71651 250674 
 
Financial non-housing (17.29 %) 86 0     954        6937     24520 185024 
 
State pension (18.35 %)  93 0 20007      26163     29963   91924 
 
Private pension (6.83 %)  39 0         0               0     10380 167214 
 
Occupational pension (7.65 %) 32 0         0    0       8714 178486 
 
Earnings (13.61 %)   54 0         0         1011    18556 543904 
 
Business (0.68 %)     4 0         0   0     0 108062 
 
Lifetime, Ω    100 15547  76871    115240    193788 865124 
 
 
Accrual, ΩR
 
Non-retired †    65    0  2947        8450       16426 123500 
 
Retired    97 0    130        1752        7808   30790 
 
 
Notes:  
Sample size: 197. Authors’ calculations from Retirement Survey data. All values 
expressed in £, net of tax, 1994 prices.  
 
§. Average percentages of lifetime wealth in parentheses. 
†. Broad definition of retirement. 
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Table 2. Determinants of self-employed retirement probabilities  
             
       Broad  ret. definition           Narrow ret.definition  .
        (1a)      (1b)     (2a)     (2b) 
Constant    2.096 *  2.160 * 2.503 * 2.622 ** 
   (1.003)  (1.015)  (1.038)  (1.048) 
No. Children    0.020   0.016    0.047   0.048 
    (0.078)  (0.077)  (0.080)  (0.080) 
Disabled    0.067   0.071  -0.321  -0.318 
    (0.282)  (0.283)  (0.298)  (0.302) 
Married   -0.019  -0.006   0.045   0.074 
    (0.349)  (0.347)  (0.335)  (0.331) 
Linear age   12.482 **  12.345 **  14.424 **  14.339 ** 
    (3.023)  (2.947)  (3.212)  (3.143) 
Quadratic age   -4.920  -4.979   -6.086 * -6.078 * 
    (2.932)  (2.881)  (2.695)  (2.647) 
Social class, s s=1   0.625   0.624   0.607   0.595 
    (0.662)  (0.661)  (0.679)  (0.677) 
s=2   0.101   0.114  -0.211  -0.197 
  (0.628)  (0.627)  (0.645)  (0.645) 
s=3   0.701   0.722   0.901   0.934 
  (0.677)  (0.679)  (0.706)  (0.710) 
s=4   0.570   0.586   0.390   0.388 
  (0.620)  (0.618)  (0.634)  (0.631) 
s=5   0.609   0.602  -0.007  -0.012 
  (0.711)  (0.712)  (0.727)  (0.728) 
Poor health score   0.010   0.010   0.027   0.025 
    (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.037)  (0.036) 
Long-term self-emp  -0.809 ** -0.799 ** -0.906 ** -0.895 ** 
    (0.266)  (0.262)  (0.277)  (0.275) 
Female   -0.005  -0.027   0.044   0.023 
    (0.306)  (0.303)  (0.293)  (0.287) 
Cares for sick relative   0.459     0.459    0.712      0.731  
    (0.459)  (0.462)  (0.481)  (0.492) 
Spouse works    -0.432  -0.437  -0.636 * -0.655 * 
    (0.289)  (0.290)  (0.286)  (0.286) 
Vocational Quals.   0.115   0.107  -0.091  -0.121 
    (0.292)  (0.295)  (0.282)  (0.277) 
Years education   -0.052  -0.056  -0.059  -0.070     
    (0.064)  (0.065)  (0.068)  (0.069) 
Accrual    -1.637  -2.430 * -0.932  -2.702 * 
    (2.720)  (1.083)  (3.273)  (1.333) 
Accrual * Lifetime wealth -0.285    -0.886   
    (1.120)    (1.653)  
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− log likelihood  85.684  85.763  82.534  82.804 
Overall significance   87.296 ** 85.115 ** 101.780 ** 100.177 ** 
Hit rate (%)   77.665  78.680  79.695  78.680 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 (6) 6.422  5.952  3.756  4.936 
Fit:  Estrella 0.413   0.410  0.478  0.474 
  R2 - ML 0.354  0.352  0.403  0.400 
 
 
Notes:  
Sample size: 197 for all regressions.  
 
All variables are defined in the text, with Accrual and Lifetime Wealth each expressed in 
hundreds of thousands f pounds. 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, obtained using a sandwich style robust covariance 
estimator.  
 
* Indicates significance at 5%; ** indicates significance at 1%. Overall significance is a 
χ2 test of the joint significance of the coefficients; degrees of freedom are 19 in columns 
1a and 1b and 18 in columns 2a and 2b. Hit rate is the proportion of correct predictions, 
using a 50 per cent cut-off rule. The Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic evaluates divergence 
between actual and predicted values: a significant value indicates a large divergence. 
Estrella and R2-ML are “R2”-type goodness of fit statistics.  
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Table 3. Characteristics of the self-employed sample in 1994 disaggregated by job 
history: mean values 
 
             
    Employees in  “Long term”   P value 
     wave 1   self-employed  
    ____________ ____________ ______ 
Discrete variables  
 
Retired (Broad)  0.831   0.500   0.000 ** 
 (Narrow)  0.807   0.430   0.000 ** 
Married   0.819   0.833   0.797 
Disabled   0.470   0.351   0.093 
Female   0.398   0.237   0.016 * 
Spouse works   0.253   0.193   0.316 
Vocational Quals.  0.181   0.202   0.711 
Cares for sick relative  0.050   0.060   0.688 
 
Continuous variables  
 
Age    67.868   65.325   0.001 ** 
Poor health score  2.465   1.513   0.086 
ln(Ω)    11.394   11.802   0.000 ** 
ln(1+ΩR)   4.984   7.735   0.000 ** 
Social class scale  2.880   3.053   0.373 
Years education  10.096   10.518   0.137 
No. Children   2.241   2.368   0.567 
 
Job history variables  
 
No. jobs between waves 0.470   0.096   0.000 **   
part-time  0.337   0.044   0.000 ** 
full-time  0.133   0.053   0.187 
No. jobless spells between waves 
    0.386   0.018   0.000 ** 
 
 
Sample size   83   114 
 
 
Notes:  
Variables defined in the text. For asterisks, see Table 2.  
 
 
Page 81 of 88
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Statistical tests: For continuous and job history variables, p-values are based on t-tests 
which are robust to unequal variances. For discrete variables, p-values are based on 
likelihood ratio χ2 tests.  
 
Source: The Retirement Survey. 
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Table 4. Determinants of employee retirement probabilities  
 
             
              Broad  ret. definition            Narrow ret.definition  .
           (3)         (4) 
  
Constant      0.474     0.382 
    (0.426)    (0.413) 
No. Children    -0.082 *   -0.068 
     (0.041)    (0.040) 
Disabled     0.109     0.153 
     (0.161)    (0.160) 
Married     0.234     0.198 
     (0.159)    (0.154) 
Linear age     29.965 **    22.157 **  
     (5.291)    (4.534) 
Quadratic age    -1.402    -5.733 
     (5.127)    (5.164) 
Social class, s s=1    -0.295    -0.336 
     (0.246)    (0.238) 
s=2   -0.146    -0.172 
   (0.234)    (0.230) 
s=3     0.093    -0.052 
   (0.241)    (0.234) 
s=4    0.226     0.082 
   (0.241)    (0.236) 
s=5    0.177     0.242 
   (0.383)    (0.377) 
Poor health score     0.061 *    0.062 * 
     (0.027)    (0.026) 
Long-term self-emp   -0.018    -0.114  
     (0.227)    (0.206) 
Female     0.392 **    0.376 ** 
     (0.145)    (0.140) 
Cares for sick relative     0.228     0.260  
     (0.262)    (0.254) 
Spouse works     -0.552 **   -0.564 ** 
     (0.143)    (0.142) 
Vocational Quals.   -0.083    -0.021   
     (0.166)    (0.162) 
Years education     0.0001    0.003 
     (0.034)    (0.033) 
Accrual      2.040     0.885 
     (1.219)    (1.241)
Page 83 of 88
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 
 
− log likelihood   301.341   316.137 
Overall significance    162.372 **   144.177 **  
Hit rate (%)    76.963    73.997 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 (8)  9.638    10.476 
Fit:  Estrella  0.273    0.243 
  R2 - ML  0.247    0.222 
 
 
Notes:  
Source: The Retirement Survey. Sample size: 573 for both regressions.  
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Table 5. Transition matrix of employment status  
 
Employment 
group 
 
Retired in 
1994 
Working 
employee in 
1994 
Working self-
employed in 
1994 
Total number, 
1988/89 
Retired in 
1988/89 
1393 41 7 1441 
Working 
employee in 
1988/89 
643 319 12 974 
Working self-
employed in 
1988/89 
73 4 57 134 
Total number, 
1994 
2109 304 76 2549 
 
Notes:  
Source: The Retirement Survey, 1994. 
 
The sample size of 76 working self-employed exceeds the 71 used in the estimation of (4) 
and (6), as 5 observations had to be dropped in those estimations owing to missing data 
on explanatory variables. 
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Table 6. Multinomial logit analysis of dynamic retirement and employment decisions 
 
             
               Working as an       Working as self-  
       employee by 1994       employed by 1994     .             
  
Dummy for  
retired in 1988/89   -1.640 **   -3.779 ** 
    (0.343)    (0.869) 
employee in 1988/89  -0.049     -3.128 ** 
    (0.337)    (0.626) 
No. Children    -0.009     -0.025 
     (0.031)    (0.028) 
Disabled    -0.216     0.957 
     (0.242)    (0.624) 
Married    -0.247    -0.310 
     (0.197)    (0.424) 
Linear age    -71.146 **   -60.597 **  
     (11.045)   (18.986) 
Quadratic age    -9.369    -6.415 
     (11.736)   (12.175) 
Social class, s s=1    -0.367    -0.896 
     (0.271)    (0.948) 
s=2   -0.148     0.010 
   (0.267)    (0.826) 
s=3    -0.393    -0.016 
   (0.276)    (0.869) 
s=4   -0.406    -0.494 
   (0.294)    (0.826) 
s=5   -0.525     0.229 
   (0.502)    (1.108) 
Poor health score    -0.008     -0.470 ** 
     (0.040)    (0.169) 
Female    -0.245      -0.255    
     (0.205)    (0.552) 
Cares for sick relative     0.008     0.053  
     (0.107)    (0.399) 
Vocational Quals.   -0.131     0.332   
     (0.181)    (0.395) 
Years education    -0.108 **   -0.090 
     (0.032)    (0.072) 
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− log likelihood     716.573 
Overall significance      753.930 **  
Hit rate (%)      85.833 
Pseudo-R2      0.345 
 
 
Notes:  
Sample size: 2047. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. The coefficients are 
log-odds ratios of being an employee or self-employed relative to retired in 1994. 
 
All explanatory variables take 1988/89 values. 
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Appendix  
 
Table A1. Earnings growth regressions used for imputing accrual values 
 
      
            Self-employed                       Employees         .
    Coefficient St. error  Coefficient St. error 
  
Constant     5.640 *  2.373   
Social class   -0.178 *  0.083     
Mixed job history    0.966 **  0.284   
Work hours     0.019 **  0.007    
Log earnings   -0.637 **   0.129   -0.403 **  0.074 
Linear age   -0.064    0.038    0.171 **  0.029 
Quadratic age       -0.002 **  0.000 
Female       -0.310 *     0.155 
Years education       -0.078 *     0.039     
Resides in South East        0.345 *  0.139 
 
 
Sample size    61      208 
σ2ω      0.763    0.884 
R2     0.441    0.270 
Overall significance: F   8.834 **   7.789 ** 
 
 
Notes:  
 
All explanatory variables measured at 1988/89 (Wave 1). Social class is that of the most 
recent job; Mixed job history is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual has 
had a job history with a mixture of paid employment and self-employment, and 0 
otherwise; and Resides in the South East and Female are also dummy variables. 
 
For asterisks, see notes to Table 2.  
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